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Abstract
We analyze the extent to which private defensive litigation insurance deters patent assertion by non-
practicing entities (NPEs). We study the effect that a patent-specific defensive insurance product,
offered by a leading litigation insurer, had on the litigation behavior of insured patents’ owners, all
of which are NPEs. We first model the impact of defensive litigation insurance on the behavior
of patent enforcers and accused infringers. We show that the availability of defensive litigation
insurance can have an effect on how often patent enforcers will assert their patents. We confirm this
result empirically showing that the insurance policy had a large, negative effect on the likelihood
that a patent included in the policy was subsequently asserted relative to other patents held by the
same NPEs and relative to patents held by other NPEs with portfolios that were entirely excluded
from the insurance product. Our findings suggest that market-based mechanisms can deter so-called
“patent trolling.”
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1 Introduction
A dramatic increase in patent assertions by so-called patent “trolls” – companies that specialize in the
enforcement of patent rights that they otherwise do not use – has been the focal point of U.S. patent law
and policy debates for well over a decade. While there is at present no consensus on the overall economic
impact of these “non-practicing” entities (NPEs), there is some evidence that NPEs’ patent assertion
activities negatively effect companies targeted for suit (Tucker, 2014; Cohen et al., 2017), leading many
to conclude that NPEs likely have a detrimental effect on innovation more broadly (Bessen and Meurer,
2014; Lemley and Feldman, 2016; Cohen et al., 2016, 2019). In the U.S., these concerns have influenced
the passage of a sweeping patent reform package, the introduction of dozens of additional bills, and the
issuance of multiple, generally pro-defendant opinions by the Supreme Court, which in the two decades
prior had all but ignored patent cases.1,2
In addition to drawing the attention of legislators and judges, concerns about the prevalence and
expense of NPE patent enforcement have also led tech companies to seek private, market-based solutions.
In recent years, for example, companies have banded together to form or fund a number of membership-
based organizations that help share costs and align incentives among frequent targets of NPE assertion.
While some such entities facilitate cross-licensing agreements among members to stem the flow of patents
from tech companies to NPEs (the License on Transfer (LOT) Network), others accumulate funds that
can be used to invalidate (Unified Patents) or to purchase (RPX and Allied Security Trust) NPE patents
that might otherwise be asserted against their members.3
In this paper, we investigate another emerging market-based mechanism with the potential to reduce
NPE activity: defensive patent litigation insurance. Unlike offensive (or abatement) insurance that
reimburses the policyholder for expenses incurred to enforce its patent right against an infringer, defensive
(or liability) insurance reimburses the policyholder for the cost of defending against allegations that
it infringed another’s patent rights.4 In the last decade, the market for defensive patent litigation
insurance has experienced a surge in demand, with some providers now offering policies specifically
for NPE defense.5 The experience of Octane Fitness, which in 2014 used the proceeds of a defensive
1In 2011, the U.S. Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011),
which (among other reforms) established a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) within the USPTO to review the validity
of issued U.S. patents. In the years since, dozens of additional patent reform bills have been introduced in Congress (Patent
Progress). For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s newfound interest in patent law, see, e.g., Gugliuzza (2017).
2Concerns about NPEs have recently spread. In Europe, many worry that the continent’s forthcoming Unified Patent
Court will attract NPE activity (McDonagh, 2014; Kopelevich, 2017). In China, concerns about patent monetization have
arisen in the wake of high-profile NPE suits filed both against Western tech companies like Apple (see Cohen, 2017) and
by Western NPEs like WiLAN (see Mitchell, 2016).
3As of November 2019, more than 650 companies have joined the LOT network and pledged nearly 2.4 million patent
assets. Unified Patents has more than 200 members and, as of March 2020, has challenged the validity of more than 185
patents.
4Because commercial general liability insurance policies provide scant, if any, coverage for harms related to IP rights
(with the exception of coverage for “advertising injury,” which in some circumstances may provide coverage for claims
of IP infringement (Mayerson, 1995; Simensky and Osterberg, 1999)), a separate niche market has developed to insure
against risks associated with IP infringement (CJA Consultants, 2003; Duchene, 2017). Both offensive and defensive
patent litigation insurance are a form of legal-expense insurance, sometimes also referred to as legal-cost insurance. Brown
(1952) is often credited with being the originator of the idea of legal-expense insurance (Stolz, 1968).
5Providers of defensive patent litigation policies in the U.S. presently include IPISC, RPX, Aon, AIG, Chubb, Lexington,
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patent litigation insurance policy to fund its appeal in a high-profile U.S. Supreme Court case,6 has also
brought increased attention to this niche product in the insurance market. While the particular insurance
policy in that case was not specifically designed to deter NPE patent assertion, Octane’s widely-reported
defensive victory nonetheless demonstrated the impact that insurance can have on a party’s ability to
counter infringement allegations, including the claims of NPEs. Surprisingly, despite the steep rise in
both NPE case filings (Marco et al., 2017) and litigation insurance providers and products, there exists
to date no systematic empirical evidence of the effect that defensive patent litigation insurance has on
the behavior of NPEs and the companies that they sue. Our goal is to fill this gap in the literature.
We study – both theoretically and empirically – the effect of a defensive insurance policy on litigation
behavior.7 We pay special attention to how insurance impacts an NPE’s decision to file a lawsuit and
(conditional on a suit being brought) the accused infringer’s willingness to settle. We first propose a
simple model in which an NPE can sue a firm for patent infringement and the parties can negotiate a
settlement before trial. For these settlement negotiations, we follow (and eventually extend) Bebchuk
(1984) by assuming that the NPE’s probability of winning its case is known only to the firm.8 Before
the NPE decides whether to file suit and before the firm observes the NPE’s success probability, the firm
can obtain patent litigation insurance that covers litigation costs (but not damages), thus improving
the firm’s outside option in settlement negotiations.9 Our model assumes that the insurance decision is
observed by the NPE. The insurer is a monopolist that uses one of two insurance pricing strategies: a
contingent insurance premium that varies with firm size, or a uniform insurance premium offered to all
firms, regardless of size.10
The NPE’s decision to file a lawsuit depends on its expected payoffs from litigation (given the firm’s
insurance decision) and its total costs of patent assertion. In our framework, the total cost of patent
assertion includes both the cost of initiating litigation and an opportunity cost in the form of a lost option
value from future infringement suits. This opportunity cost captures the NPE’s risk of invalidation
and arises because (outside of our model) the firm can attempt to invalidate the asserted patent as
part of its defense. If the patent is indeed invalidated, no further infringement suits with potential
infringement damages payments are feasible and, consequently, the NPE’s future revenue stream is
the Association of National Advertisers (ANA), and Unified Patents. In Europe, London Lloyd’s and Allianz offer policies
as well.
6Octane Fitness, LLC v. ION Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
7The defensive insurance policy is a special case of legal-expense insurance as studied, for instance, by Kirstein (2000)
or Baik and Kim (2007). Such insurance can be viewed as a form of third-party litigation funding. Faure and de Mot
(2012) provide a direct comparison of third-party litigation funding (not including funding via insurance) and legal-expense
insurance. Prescott et al. (2014), Prescott and Spier (2016), de Mot and Faure (2016), Spier and Prescott (2019), or Lavie
and Tabbach (2020) study the functioning of more general third-party litigation funding mechanisms.
8Given this assumption, pretrial settlement negotiations are under asymmetric information. For other classic contri-
butions to the literature on bargaining under asymmetric information in law and economics, see Reinganum and Wilde
(1986), Nalebuff (1987), or Kennan and Wilson (1993).
9For our model, we assume that the firm retains the decision to settle the case and is in control of the terms of the
settlement. We further assume there is no renegotiation with the insurance company. We confirmed the reasonableness of
this assumption with the insurance provider.
10In our framework, the insurance premium is the monopolist’s only choice variable. For a more thorough theoretical
analysis of liability insurance policies in different competitive environments, see Lemus et al. (forthcoming).
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significantly reduced.11
We show that, within our framework, an insured firm will not accept an NPE’s settlement offer and
therefore will proceed to trial (and place the NPE’s future revenue at risk) if sued. Anticipating the
effects of insurance on their expected payoffs (from settlement or trial), NPEs with sufficiently high total
costs of patent assertion will refrain from filing a lawsuit. NPEs with low total costs of patent assertion,
on the other hand, will bring suit irrespective of the firm’s insurance status. As a consequence, firms that
expect insurance to reduce their litigation exposure (i.e., firms that otherwise anticipate being targeted
by higher-cost NPEs) have a higher willingness to pay for insurance than firms that anticipate being sued
by low-cost NPEs whether or not they elect to buy insurance. We also show that the firm’s willingness
to pay increases with firm size (which we assume to be related to potential infringement damages).
The effect of insurance on the firm’s willingness to pay, in turn, affects the insurance company’s
pricing decision. When the insurer uses contingent insurance pricing, firms that anticipate litigation by
low-cost NPEs are priced out. In equilibrium, the insurer sets a high premium and provides coverage
only to firms for which insurance reduces litigation exposure.12 As a result, in equilibrium, the insurer
never reimburses litigation costs because NPEs sue only firms without insurance. When the insurance
premium is uniform (and not a function of firm size), small firms are priced out of the market (because
their willingness to pay is lower than the uniform premium), whereas large firms buy insurance even
when it does not serve as a deterrent. In this scenario, the insurer reimburses some litigation costs in
equilibrium to large firms.
From equilibrium results of the model, we derive three main predictions. First, we find that, for both
pricing strategies, the introduction of insurance decreases the likelihood that an NPE brings a patent
infringement suit. Second, in a scenario with uniform insurance pricing, we find that insurance also
reduces the likelihood that a case, once brought, is settled. Under contingent insurance pricing, this
effect vanishes, however. Third, we show that insurance has ambiguous effects on the likelihood that
small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) are targeted by NPEs.13 With contingent pricing, our model
predicts a decrease in the likelihood that SMEs are sued; however, with uniform insurance pricing (or
a premium structure that is not sufficiently contingent on size), our model predicts that SMEs will be
targeted more often.
11We take a simplified reduced-form approach by assuming that these costs are incurred at the time the NPE files its
lawsuit. With this assumption, our work is related to the literature on externalities in litigation (Choi, 1998; Farrell and
Merges, 2004; Farrell and Shapiro, 2008), because defending patent infringement suits generates uncompensated positive
externalities for one’s competitors (in particular when invalidation actions are involved). Note that, for the opportunity
costs to arise, we assume the application of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel (which prevents a patentee from
further assertion of a patent that has been held invalid). Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It is undisputed that as a result of collateral estoppel, a judgment of invalidity in one patent action
renders the patent invalid in any later actions based on the same patent.” (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971))).
12Insurance serves as a litigation deterrent when NPEs have higher opportunity costs of litigation (i.e., higher lost option
value of future infringement actions). This means that insurance deters NPEs that expect to lose high revenue streams from
licensing or litigation – possibly because they hold weak patents and expect them to be invalidated with a high probability.
The insurance deterrence effect is therefore stronger when there are larger externalities in litigation.
13The vulnerability of SMEs is a concern that has played a central role in recent patent reform debates in the U.S. and
Europe (e.g., European Commission, 2014).
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Next, to quantify the effect of litigation insurance on NPEs’ litigation behavior, we analyze the effect
of a defensive litigation insurance product offered in recent years by the Intellectual Property Insurance
Services Corporation (IPISC), a leading provider of insurance policies related to intellectual property (IP)
rights. Uniquely among comparable insurance packages, this “troll defense” insurance product insures
not against NPE litigation generally, but rather against the assertion of specific patents included on
two publicly-accessible lists. If one or more of these patents is asserted against an insured party, IPISC
reimburses (subject to deductibles, co-insurance, and caps) the insured company for expenses incurred
to defend itself against infringement allegations, including by challenging the patent’s validity.14
By taking advantage of the policy’s applicability to specific patents, we are able to study NPEs’
responses to the policy’s introduction and, by virtue of this methodology, avoid the difficulties inherent in
attempting instead to measure the policy’s effect on purchasers. To determine the effect of IPISC’s policy
on litigation, we employ a difference-in-differences design that compares patent assertions in U.S. district
courts before and after the insurance policy’s launch. Our treatment group consists of all patents covered
by IPISC’s NPE insurance policy (“insured patents”). For our comparison group, we use patents that
are not covered by the insurance (“uninsured patents”). To address potential spill-over effects between
insured and uninsured patents held by the same NPEs, we construct three different comparison groups.
Comparison Group 1 comprises all uninsured patents owned by those NPEs that own insured patents.
Comparison Group 2 comprises all patents in Comparison Group 1 plus all uninsured patents owned by
the parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates of NPEs that own insured patents. Finally, Comparison Group 3
comprises all patents owned by all NPEs that were not impacted by the insurance policy. In addition,
we match each set of comparison patents to our set of insured patents using a variety of observable
patent characteristics that determined insurance coverage according to information obtained directly
from IPISC.
We present three main findings. First, the availability of insurance had a negative effect on the
likelihood that a patent included in the policy was subsequently asserted, and our results are robust
across all comparison groups that we constructed. Second, among defendants accused of infringing
insured patents, we see an increase in the share of SMEs targeted once insurance becomes available.
Thus, a potential unintended consequence of insurance may be that NPEs target smaller companies more
often, perhaps because SMEs are priced out of the market for litigation insurance when the insurance
premium structure is not sufficiently contingent (that is, too uniform). Third, we find that the availability
of insurance impacted NPE patent sales and acquisitions. NPEs were less likely to sell insured patents
following the launch of IPISC’s policy, and NPEs with a relatively large ratio of insured-over-uninsured
patents in their portfolios were more likely to acquire new patents post-launch.
Our model and empirical findings shed new light on the dynamics of NPE litigation and, more
14The policy does not reimburse any damages payable in case the insured company loses the court case.
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broadly, the effects of litigation insurance. Perhaps most importantly from a policy perspective, our
results suggest that private market-based mechanisms can deter NPE activity,15 a finding that has
importance for ongoing debates among scholars and policymakers about the need for further legislative
or judicial reform of patent systems across the globe. More generally, our paper also advances the study
of legal expense insurance. To our knowledge, no empirical studies of patent litigation insurance have
been attempted to date, and few have attempted an inferential analysis of legal expense insurance in any
context (what few causal studies exist, focus on auto insurance (e.g., Fenn and Rickman, 2001)). Overall,
the existing empirical literature is primarily descriptive in nature and concentrates on individuals’ access
to legal services rather than insurance’s effect on outcomes.16 Similarly, we are aware of just one existing
theoretical model of patent litigation insurance (Lemus et al., forthcoming), and very few studies of
defensive litigation insurance in any context. The existing theoretical literature focuses on offensive
litigation insurance and shows that such policies could be used to deter potential market entrants (van
Velthoven and van Wijck, 2001; Heyes et al., 2004; Llobet and Suarez, 2012) and may be attractive
even to risk-neutral agents (Kirstein, 2000). Among the few who have examined defensive insurance
are Kirstein (2000), who studies the insurance decisions of both parties in an accident model, and
Baik and Kim (2007), who model litigation as a contest with delegation and find that a defendant’s
legal expense insurance may result in more litigation spending. Most relevant to our analysis is Lemus
et al. (forthcoming), who study defensive patent litigation insurance (to motivate their work on liability
insurance) but focus on the design of optimal liability insurance contracts. Our model differs substantially
in that we take the non-price features of the insurance contract as given and assume simple insurance
pricing strategies to focus instead on the effect of such an insurance contract on litigation.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a model of defensive
insurance’s impact on NPE behavior. In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of the specific
insurance policy used in our analysis and explain our data collection methodology. In Section 4, we
discuss the selection of patents into the insurance policy. In Section 5, we present our main empirical
results, and we offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Model
For our insurance-litigation model, we extend a simplified version of the model of settlement and litigation
with private information in Bebchuk (1984) by considering (1) the insurer’s pricing decision for the
insurance policy, (2) a potential defendant firm’s decision to purchase litigation insurance, and (3) the
15We find this despite the difficulties inherent in such deterrence. In many respects, NPE patent assertion resembles
a classic collective action problem. For instance, despite decrying NPE lawsuits, operating technology companies are
themselves the source of the majority of patents acquired by NPEs (Love et al., 2018). In addition, defending patent
infringement suits generates uncompensated positive externalities for one’s competitors (Farrell and Merges, 2004).
16See for example, Wilson and Wydrzynski (1978) for Canada, Blankenburg (1982) and Kilian (2003) for Germany,
Rickman and Fenn (1998) for England and Wales, or Regan (2003) for Sweden).
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Figure 1: Timeline
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Litigation
plaintiff NPE’s decision to bring a lawsuit. We depict the timeline of our model in Figure 1 and summarize
the notation in Table 1.
2.1 Timing and Notation
There are two parties, a firm (a potential defendant) and an NPE (the plaintiff). Both parties are
risk neutral. Through its product market activities, the firm of size ω > 0 may infringe an existing
patent (held by the NPE)17 upon which the NPE can sue for patent infringement damages.18 Potential
infringement damages W > 0 are a monotonically increasing function of firm size, W = W (ω), allowing
for a simple way to consider firm size in our model.19
The NPE’s win probability in litigation is denoted by p. It is drawn from a distribution on the
support
[
p, p
]
, 0 < p < p ≤ 1, with a pdf f(·) and cdf F (·). For the sake of tractability, we assume
the firm’s type is uniformly distributed. We further assume p = 1 so that p ∼ U
[
p, 1
]
. As in Bebchuk
(1984), we assume that the firm knows the realization of p, while the NPE knows only its distribution.20
Before the case goes to trial, the parties enter settlement negotiations in which the NPE makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer S. If the firm accepts the offer, the case is closed. If the firm rejects and the
case goes to trial, the firm incurs litigation costs Cd. We assume that the NPE’s litigation costs Cp
are included in its total costs of patent assertion k, incurred at the time of filing the case in t = 4, so
that Cp = 0.
21 Total costs of patent assertion comprise nominal filing fees as well as opportunity costs
17This does not mean that the firm actually copied the infringing technology. To the contrary, copying is rarely alleged
in U.S. patent litigation (Cotropia and Lemley, 2009).
18Note that while many patentees do attempt to license their rights before filing suit (Lemley et al., 2019), this is not
a common strategy among sophisticated NPEs, which tend to file suit without warning in order to secure venue in one
of a small number of favorable jurisdictions (Love and Yoon, 2017). This motivates our assumption of assertion without
licensing.
19For supporting empirical evidence, see, for instance, Mazzeo et al. (2013). For a theoretical motivation, suppose
damages are based on reasonable royalties, with ρ the royalty rate and the firm’s patent-specific revenues R(ω) as royalty
base. Assuming that revenues are higher for larger firms, so that R(ω) is increasing in ω, we get potential damages
W (ω) = ρR(ω) increasing in ω.
20An exogenous value of p is inconsistent with willful infringement (as a consequence of moral hazard) which would
presumably be excluded from coverage in any policy actually offered for sale. In principle, any patent infringement could
be deemed “intentional” to some extent because all issued patents become public documents. However, in practice, pre-
clearance of patent rights is generally regarded as not cost-effective and, in fact, may be practically impossible in some
markets (especially those where NPEs are active). Mulligan and Lee (2012) estimate that “[i]n software, for example,
patent clearance by all firms would require many times more hours of legal research than all patent lawyers in the United
States can bill in a year” because “there are around twenty-four billion new [software] patent-firm pairs each year that
could produce accidental infringement.” As a result, it is generally assumed that tech firms ignore other firms’ patents
unless and until they are accused of infringement (Lemley, 2008).
21Because the NPE incurs these total costs of patent assertion at the time of filing in t = 4 and litigation costs in t = 8
are zero, the NPE has no reason to drop a case once the firm has rejected a settlement offer because expected payoffs are
non-negative even for the lowest p. The technical assumption in Bebchuk (1984) (that a plaintiff does not drop the case
upon the defendant’s rejection of the settlement offer) trivially holds true in our model because Cp = 0.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Variable Description
ω > 0 Firm size
W > 0 Potential patent infringement damages; monotonically increasing in firm size ω
p ∈
[
p, 1
]
NPE’s win probability, with pdf f(·) and cdf F (·); uniformly distributed
k ∈
[
0, k̄
]
NPE’s total costs of patent assertion, with pdf g(·) and cdf G(·); uniformly distributed
Cd > 0 Firm’s litigation costs
Cp = 0 NPE’s litigation costs
M ; Mm Insurance premium; profit-maximizing premium
Φ(M); Cs(M) Insurer’s demand function; insurer’s marginal costs of providing insurance
Π(M) Insurer’s profits
M̃ , M̂ Firm’s willingness to pay for insurance
stemming from the risk of invalidation (i.e., the lost option value from future infringement law suits).22
We introduce total costs of patent assertion as an NPE-specific parameter on the support
[
0, k̄
]
and will
for brevity refer to it as the NPE’s type. For tractability, we assume that the upper bound of the support
of k falls within the following interval:
Assumption 1. The upper bound for the NPE’s type k satisfies the following condition:
k̄ ∈
(
Cd
1− p
,
Cd
1− p
[
1 + p+
√
2
(
1 + p
)])
The lower bound of this interval ensures litigation in equilibrium. The upper bound is for tractability
of the insurance pricing decision. The population distribution (assumed to be uniform) of k is common
knowledge, with pdf g(·) and cdf G(·).
Before observing the success probability and the NPE’s decision to bring suit, the firm has the option
to buy a defensive litigation insurance policy at a premium of M . This insurance policy covers the
firm’s litigation costs when it decides to defend in a patent litigation lawsuit. The firm retains the
decision to settle the case and is in control of the terms of the settlement. We further assume there is
no renegotiation with the insurance company.
The insurance premium is set by a monopolistic insurer. We restrict the insurer’s pricing strategies to
a uniform premium with respect to the firm’s type p and the NPE’s type k.23 We do consider, however,
a pricing strategy that allows the insurer to set an insurance premium as a function of firm size. The
insurer chooses the optimal price M(W ) given the population densities for p ∼ U
[
p, 1
]
and k ∼ U
[
0, k̄
]
.
The insurer operates at marginal costs Cs that are equal to the expected reimbursed litigation costs.
22When an NPE asserts a patent, the firm may counter with a defense and/or counterclaim. If the NPE’s patent is
indeed invalidated, no further infringement suits with potential infringement damages payments are feasible.
23We refer to p as the firm’s type because the firm has private knowledge over the NPE’s win probability in court. The
NPE’s type k is observed by all parties after the firm makes its insurance purchase decision.
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2.2 Information
We have assumed the NPE observes the firm’s insurance purchase decision and thus knows the firm’s
litigation costs (C̃ = Cd without insurance and C̃ = 0 with insurance).
24 Our model further contains
two random variables. The firm’s type p is the NPE’s probability of winning at trial. Following Bebchuk
(1984), the firm’s type is its private information, observed after the insurance purchase. The second
random variable is the NPE’s type. The suing NPE’s opportunity cost is a function of the insurance
policy (and a function of whether that NPE’s patents are included in the policy). By the time the firm
buys insurance, it knows the details of the insurance policy and can form expectations about which NPEs
are likely affected by the policy and likely to file suit for infringement of a patent that is covered by the
policy. This allows the firm to form expectations about the NPE’s type k that is likely to file suit (in
t = 4).
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction, starting with the last period and
gradually moving toward the first stage of the game.
2.3.1 Litigation and Settlement
The analysis in this first step follows Bebchuk (1984). We present the equilibrium settlement offer and
settlement likelihood of this subgame (periods t = 6, t = 7, and t = 8) in Lemma 1 below. Notational
details are in the proof in the Appendix.
In the last period t = 8 of the game (see Figure 1), when the case goes to trial, the NPE’s gross
expected payoffs (not accounting for costs k) are A = pW and do not depend on the firm’s insurance
status. The gross payoffs (not accounting for the costs M of purchasing the insurance policy) for the
firm are B(C̃) = −pW − C̃ where C̃ = Cd for the firm without insurance and C̃ = 0 for a firm with
insurance. If a case is settled, the payoffs are S for the NPE and −S for the firm.
In period t = 7, the firm accepts the NPE’s settlement offer if −S ≥ B(C̃). This condition holds as
long as the NPE’s success probability at trial is sufficiently high such that p ≥ q = q(S, C̃) where
q(S, C̃) =
S − C̃
W
. (1)
If the firm rejects the offer, the case goes to trial.25
24In models with symmetric information, litigation does not typically arise in equilibrium. Private information about
the success of litigation (as in this paper) is one way of introducing frictions in the settlement negotiations that result in
litigation as an equilibrium phenomenon. In Ganglmair et al. (2018), we take a different approach. We have symmetric
information about the NPE’s success probability, but assume that the firm’s insurance decision is not observed by the
NPE.
25Bebchuk (1984) explicitly assumes that litigation has a positive expected value even for the lowest value of p. Given
our assumption of Cp = 0, this condition is always satisfied because A = pW ≥ 0.
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In t = 6, when it makes the settlement offer S, the NPE anticipates that the firm will accept the offer
with probability 1−F (q), in which case the parties’ payoffs are S for the NPE and −S for the firm. The
firm will reject the offer with probability F (q), when p < q, and the case moves on to trial. The NPE
expects to win at trial with the conditional win probability of p̂(q) =
∫ q
p
xf(x)dx
F (q) . The NPE’s payoffs, as a
function of the settlement offer S and the firm’s litigation costs C̃ ∈ {0, Cd} (through the firm’s decision
to accept or reject the settlement offer), are denoted by A(S, C̃) = (1− F (q))S+F (q)p̂(q)W . The NPE
offers a settlement amount S = S∗ so as to maximize these expected payoffs.
Lemma 1 (Settlement).
1. For a firm without insurance (and C̃ = Cd > 0), the equilibrium settlement offer is
S∗ =
 pW + C̃ if W ≤
C̃
1−p
W if W > C̃1−p .
(2)
For a firm with insurance (and C̃ = 0), any settlement offer S∗ ≥W is optimal.
2. The likelihood of the parties settling the case,
L∗ =

1 if W ≤ C̃1−p
C̃
(1−p)W
if C̃1−p < W < W + C̃
0 if W ≥W + C̃,
(3)
is lower with insurance. For firms without insurance, it is constant (= 1) in firm size for small
firms and decreasing in firm size for larger firms. For firms with insurance (and C̃ = 0), it is equal
to zero.
As in Bebchuk (1984), the likelihood of settlement is increasing in litigation costs. We further show
that, given no insurance, smaller firms are more likely to settle (and small firms with W ≤ C̃1−p always
settle). With insurance, firms never settle.
2.3.2 Patent Assertion
From here on, our model extends the work by Bebchuk (1984). In t = 4, the NPE will have observed
whether or not the firm purchased insurance. Moreover, it will know its own type (and total costs of
patent assertion) k. Given this information, the NPE asserts the patent and brings a patent infringement
suit26 if the expected payoffs from litigation (or settlement), A∗(C̃) := A(S∗, C̃), outweigh the total costs
26Of course, at this stage, before formally filing the case, the parties could enter into pre-filing settlement negotiations.
The exact timing of the firm observing the NPE’s type does not change this but will merely affect the type of bargaining
game the parties will play. We do not consider such settlement negotiations before a case is filed but instead refer to He
(2020) for a formal treatment.
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of patent assertion, A∗(C̃) ≥ k, with
A∗(C̃) =

pW + C̃ if W ≤ C̃1−p
(1+p)W
2 +
C̃2
2(1−p)W
if W > C̃1−p .
(4)
Lemma 2 (Patent Assertion). The NPE’s expected payoffs from litigation are lower when the firm has
purchased insurance, A∗(Cd) > A
∗(0). The NPE’s decision to file suit is a function of its type k:
1. If k ≤ A∗(0), the NPE plaintiff always files a lawsuit, regardless of the firm’s insurance status.
2. If A∗(0) < k ≤ A∗(Cd), the NPE files a lawsuit if and only if the firm has not purchased insurance.
3. If k > A∗(Cd), the NPE never files suit.
The NPE benefits from higher Cd as it is able to extract a higher expected settlement from the firm.
This further implies that, given the firm’s insurance status, the NPE is more likely to bring suit when the
firm’s litigation costs are higher (the right-hand-side arm of A∗(Cd), for higher values of W , is shifting
upward). For low total costs of patent assertion, the NPE always files a suit, regardless of the firm’s
insurance status. For high total costs of patent assertion, the NPE never files a suit. It is for intermediate
values of k where the insurance policy has a litigation-deterrent effect: the NPE files if, and only if, the
firm has not purchased an insurance policy.
Corollary 1. Conditional on the firm’s insurance status, the NPE is more likely to sue larger firms.
Moreover, insurance is less effective as a deterrent for litigation when firms are larger.
2.3.3 Insurance Purchase
Given uncertainty about its own type p in t = 3, the firm’s expected payoffs (gross of the insurance
premium) when the NPE files suit are
B∗(C̃) = − (1− F (q∗))S∗ − F (q∗)
[
p̂(q∗)W + C̃
]
(5)
with q∗ = q(S∗, C̃). The firm’s payoffs from the case when the NPE decides not to file are normalized
to zero. Observing the insurance policy in t = 1 allows the firm to form expectations about the NPE’s
type k and thus anticipate the (respective) NPE’s decision to file suit (given the firm’s insurance status).
The firm’s expected payoffs with insurance (now net of the insurance premium) are
B∗(C̃ = 0)−M =
 − (1− F (q
∗))S∗ − F (q∗)p̂(q∗)W −M if k ≤ A∗(0)
−M if k > A∗(0).
(6)
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The expected payoffs for a firm without insurance are
B∗(C̃ = Cd) =
 − (1− F (q
∗))S∗ − F (q∗) [p̂(q∗)W + Cd] if k ≤ A∗(Cd)
0 if k > A∗(Cd).
(7)
Notice the different critical thresholds for k in equations (6) and (7). We summarize the firm’s decision
to purchase insurance as follows:
Lemma 3 (Insurance Decision).
1. For low NPE types, k ≤ A∗(0), the firm buys insurance if M ≤ M̂(W ) with
M̂(W ) =

Cd −
(1−p)W
2 if W ≤
Cd
1−p
Cd
[
1− Cd
2W(1−p)
]
if W > Cd1−p .
(8)
2. For intermediate NPE types, A∗(0) < k ≤ A∗(Cd), the firm buys insurance if M ≤ M̃(W ) with
M̃(W ) = M̂(W ) +
(
1 + p
)
W
2
=

Cd + pW if W ≤ Cd1−p
Cd
[
1− Cd
2W(1−p)
]
+
(1+p)W
2 if W >
Cd
1−p .
(9)
3. For high NPE types, k > A∗(0), the firm does not buy insurance.
The firm’s willingness to pay for insurance when the NPE is of intermediate type k (and insurance
is an effective deterrent) is higher than when the NPE is of low type (and the NPE files suit regardless
of the insurance status), M̃(W ) > M̂(W ). This deterrence effect comes at additional value to the firm,
and the willingness to pay reflects that.
2.3.4 Policy Pricing
At the outset of the game, in period t = 1, an insurance company designs an insurance policy and sets
a premium M . We take the policy as given and derive the equilibrium insurance premium. We first
consider a scenario in which the insurance company can set the insurance premium as a function of firm
size (and thus of potential, or expected, damages). For a second (and simpler) scenario, we assume the
insurance company sets a uniform premium for the policy.
Firm-Size Contingent Insurance Premium. The insurance company is a monopolist and chooses
a premium Mm that maximizes its expected profits
Π(M) = Φ(M) [M − Cs(M)] (10)
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where Φ(M) denotes the demand for insurance and Cs(M) the marginal costs of offering insurance (in
the form of litigation costs reimbursements), both as functions of the insurance premium.
For a firm of size ω and potential (or expected) damages W = W (ω), the insurance company forms
expectations about the demand for the insurance policy given the population distribution of the NPE’s
type k (characterized by its cdf G(·)) and the firm’s insurance purchase decision (as function of k) in
Lemma 3.27 The demand for insurance is equal to
Φ(M) =

G(A∗(Cd)) if M ≤ M̂
G(A∗(Cd))−G(A∗(C0)) if M̂ < M ≤ M̃
0 if M > M̃ .
(11)
Given A∗(Cd) > A
∗(0) so that G(A∗(Cd)) > G(A
∗(0)), the demand function is decreasing in the insur-
ance premium.
The marginal costs of insurance are the expected costs from reimbursing litigation costs Cd if a case
goes to trial. The insurer incurs these costs when the firm purchases insurance and the NPE sues an
insured firm. This is the case for M < M̂ and k ≤ A∗(0). Moreover, in case the NPE files a suit, the
case goes to trial with probability 1−L∗(0) = 1. Putting the pieces together, the insurer’s marginal cost
function is
Cs(M) =
 G(A
∗(0))Cd if M ≤ M̂
0 if M > M̂ .
(12)
Profits are a step-function of M , and the profit-maximizing premium is Mm ∈
{
M̂, M̃
}
. For the
lower premium, Mm = M̂(W ), the insurance company incurs marginal costs as it has to reimburse
the firm for its litigation costs whenever the firm rejects the NPE’s settlement offer. For the higher
insurance premium, Mm = M̃(W ), the insurance company sells fewer policies but does not have to
reimburse litigation costs – because the firm purchases insurance only for intermediate values of k, and
NPEs with intermediate values of k only file suit against uninsured firms. Because the respective levels
of willingness to pay are functions of firm size (or rather, functions of potential damages W (ω) that are,
by assumption, a function of firm size), the insurance premium is a function of firm size.
Lemma 4 (Contingent Insurance Pricing). The insurance premium is Mm = M̃(W ) for all W (ω) so
that the firm buys insurance only for intermediate type NPEs. The insurance company does not sell
policies to sufficiently large firms with W (ω) ≥ 2k̄1+p .
In equilibrium, in the scenario of contingent insurance pricing, the insurance company sets the higher
premium. It thus foregoes sales and revenue (because firms purchase insurance only for intermediate
27Assuming a firm population with unit mass, the demand function Φ(M) reflects the share of firms that purchase
insurance for a given premium M .
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values of k) in exchange for never having to reimburse litigation costs. Because for intermediate levels of
k, the NPE does not sue firms with insurance, in equilibrium, the insurance company does not incur any
reimbursement costs. Further, observe that for sufficiently large firms (with sufficiently high W ), the
optimal insurance premium is too high for any firm to purchase an insurance policy. With contingent
insurance pricing, we would expect smaller firms to be more eager to buy insurance (at lower cost than
larger firms).
Corollary 2. The equilibrium insurance premium is increasing in firm size.
With the previous results, we can now characterize the equilibrium outcome of the insurance-litigation
game when the insurance premium is a function of firm size.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Outcome with Contingent Insurance Pricing). In the subgame perfect equi-
librium of the insurance-litigation game with a firm size-contingent insurance premium, the equilibrium
outcome is as follows: The insurer sells the policy at a high premium so that only firms anticipating suit
by intermediate type NPEs will purchase it. As a consequence, only NPEs of low type sue for patent
infringement (suing only firms without insurance for patent infringement). These cases settle with prob-
ability L∗ = 1 for a settlement amount S∗ = pW + Cd (for low W ) or strictly positive probability
L∗ = Cd
(1−p)W
and settlement amount S∗ = W and (for high W ).
Because of the high premium, firms buy insurance only if it serves as a deterrent (for intermediate
values of k). This, in return, implies that only NPEs of low type will sue firms for patent infringement.
Intermediate-type NPEs, those with relatively higher opportunity costs of litigation (e.g., from higher
lost option value of future infringement actions) are deterred. This insurance deterrence effect therefore
arises when there are larger externalities in litigation (Choi, 1998; Farrell and Merges, 2004; Farrell and
Shapiro, 2008).
In our second scenario with uniform insurance pricing below, we show a more differentiated picture,
especially for small firms.
Uniform Insurance Premium. For the second pricing scenario, we assume that the insurance
provider is limited in its pricing choices and can set only a uniform insurance premium – not contingent
on firm size.
The expressions for insurance demand, marginal costs, and profits in equations (10), (11), and (12)
continue to apply. In this scenario, however, the insurance company also takes expectations over firm
size ω (and thus potential damages W ). We do not desire to make any assumptions about the functional
form of the distributions ω and W but instead assume an interior solution of the pricing stage of our
insurance-litigation game. In this interior solution, the uniform insurance premium is too high for some
small firms to ever buy insurance and sufficiently low for some large firms to buy insurance for all but
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the high NPE types:
M > M̃(W ) for some W < W small (13)
M < M̂(W ) for some W > W large. (14)
Notice that all other (medium-sized) firms are behaviorally equivalent to the firms in our first scenario.
These firms buy insurance only for intermediate NPE types (as in Proposition 1). We summarize this
interior solution in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 (Uniform Insurance Pricing). In an interior solution for the pricing stage of the insurance-
litigation game, the insurance premium is such that small firms with W < W small never buy insurance,
medium firms with W ∈
[
W small,W large
]
buy insurance only for intermediate NPE types, and large firms
with W > W large buy insurance for all but high NPE types.
Given the solution in Lemma 5, the equilibrium outcome of the scenario with a uniform insurance
premium is as follows:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Outcome with Uniform Insurance Pricing). In the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the insurance-litigation game with a uniform insurance premium as in Lemma 5, the equilibrium
outcome is as follows:
1. Small firms never buy insurance. As a consequence, all but high-type NPEs sue for patent infringe-
ment. These cases settle with probability L∗ = 1 for a settlement amount S∗ = pW + Cd (for low
W ) or strictly positive probability L∗ = Cd
(1−p)W
and settlement amount S∗ = W (for high W ).
2. Medium firms buy insurance only when anticipating suit by intermediate type NPEs. As a con-
sequence, only NPEs of low type sue for patent infringement (suing only firms without insurance
for patent infringement). These cases settle with probability L∗ = 1 for a settlement amount
S∗ = pW + Cd (for low W ) or strictly positive probability L∗ = Cd(1−p)W and settlement amount
S∗ = W and (for high W ).
3. Large firms buy insurance for all but high-type NPEs. As a consequence, only NPEs of low type
sue for patent infringement (suing firms with insurance). These cases do not settle.
2.4 Predictions
Propositions 1 and 2 summarize the equilibrium outcomes of our insurance-litigation game under two
different scenarios of policy pricing. In what follows, we derive the predictions of our model from these
propositions. Specifically, we ask how the introduction of defensive litigation insurance affects NPE case
volume, likelihood of settlement, and the likelihood that NPEs sue SMEs.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Outcome: Insurance and Patent Assertion
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In Figure 2, we provide graphical illustrations of the equilibrium outcomes for both pricing scenarios.
In each panel, we plot the NPE’s expected payoffs from litigation with insurance A∗(0) and without
insurance A∗(Cd) against firm size (proxied by potential damages W ). The gray-shaded regions depict
the respective parameter spaces (firm size and NPE type k) for which firms purchase insurance, and the
dot-shaded regions depict the parameter spaces where the NPE brings suit. Regions with both shadings
are those where the NPE sues a firm with insurance (and the insurance companies reimburses litigation
costs Cd). Recall that without the availability of insurance, the NPE sues in the combined shaded regions
(of both panels).
2.4.1 Case Volume
For our first prediction, we ask how the introduction of insurance affects the number of NPE suits filed.
Prediction 1. The availability of insurance lowers the volume of patent assertions.
This prediction arises from both pricing scenarios. From Proposition 1 for contingent pricing, we
know that only firms (of a given size ω with potential damages W (ω)) facing intermediate NPE types
k purchase insurance (gray-shaded region in Panel (a) of Figure 2). For low NPE types, firms do not
purchase the policy and are subsequently sued by the NPE (dot-shaded region). Without available
insurance, the set of lawsuits is the combined shaded region; with insurance, the set of lawsuits is smaller
as the suits from the gray-shaded region are no longer observed in equilibrium.
In the second scenario with uniform pricing, the insurance effect on case volume persists but is
weaker. While in the first scenario, the introduction of insurance eliminates cases for intermediate NPE
types (irrespective of firm size), in this scenario, insurance only affects whether intermediate type NPEs
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decide to sue sufficiently large firms with W ≥W small. In Panel (b), the respective region is depicted by
gray-shaded (and solid-line bordered) region. For small firms (with W < W small) and large firms (with
low-type NPEs), however, we observe no insurance effect.
2.4.2 Settlement
For our second prediction, we ask how the introduction of insurance affects the likelihood of settlement
of suits that are filed.
Prediction 2. The availability of insurance does not increase the likelihood of settlement (conditional
on a lawsuit filed).
First consider the scenario with contingent pricing. Recall from the discussion above that, here,
insured firms are not sued, while firms without insurance are sued and moreover settle the suits filed
against them at the same rate as they would in world without insurance. Thus, the availability of
insurance has no effect on the likelihood of settlement (conditional on patent assertion).
In the scenario with uniform pricing, we expect a lower conditional likelihood of settlement stemming
from large firms (with W > W large). Large firms facing low-type NPEs (in the combined gray and
dot-shaded regions) buy insurance and are sued. Unlike in a world without insurance where firms settle
with strictly positive probability, these large firms with insurance (and zero effective litigation costs) will
not settle when sued.
2.4.3 Firm-Size Effects
Finally, for our third prediction, we consider the effect of insurance on NPE patent assertion against
SMEs, a concern which has played a central role in recent patent reform debates in the U.S. and Europe.
Prediction 3. The availability of insurance has an ambiguous effect on SMEs. With contingent pricing,
SMEs are less likely to be sued by NPEs. With uniform pricing, however, the opposite it true.
For the scenario with contingent pricing, recall that we find the effect of insurance availability in the
set of firms facing intermediate-type NPEs (gray-shaded region in Panel (b) of Figure 2). In this region,
insurance serves as a deterrent. The range of NPE types for which that is the case, however, is inversely
correlated with firm size, implying that insurance is relatively more effective for small firms than for
large firms. Consequently, we expect large firms to be targeted by NPEs relatively more often following
the introduction of insurance.
Uniform insurance pricing, however, moves the needle in the opposite direction. The only firms that
see a reduction in patent litigation are sufficiently large firms (with W > W large). Small firms (with
W ≤W large) that do not purchase insurance are sued just as often as they would be in a world without
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insurance. Thus, overall, the share of small firms sued (over all firms) – and thus the relative likelihood
that small firms are sued – will increase when insurance becomes available.
Both uniform pricing and fully contingent pricing are, of course, convenient theoretical assumptions.
A more realistic pricing structure is likely to lie between these two polar cases. Such a premium structure
that is not sufficiently contingent on size, that means, it is too uniform, will yield lower insurance adoption
rates, making SMEs relatively more attractive targets.
3 Data
Next, to quantify the effect of litigation insurance on NPE behavior, we undertake an empirical analysis
of a defensive litigation insurance product offered by IPISC, an insurer that specializes in insurance
products related to IP rights.28 Before presenting the results of our analysis, we provide details on the
insurance policy that we study and the methodologies that we follow to construct a database of patents,
litigation, and litigant data.
3.1 IPISC NPE Litigation Insurance
The empirical analyses in the sections that follow investigate the impact of IPISC’s “troll defense” policy,
which was first launched in May 2014. Among other available policies that insure against NPE patent
assertion, IPISC’s is unique in that it insures only against the enforcement of specific NPE-owned patents
listed on two publicly available “menus” that act as complements. Menu 1 contains 200 patents owned
by various NPEs, and Menu 2 contains an additional 107. Purchasers have the option to insure against
only those patents listed in Menu 1, or they can elect to purchase additional coverage for patents listed
in Menu 2.29 A company that selects the latter option will be insured against any lawsuit enforcing any
one of these 307 total patents. Menus 1 and 2 are both published on IPISC’s website, and each menu
provides the patent number, last-recorded owner, title, and technology classification (assigned by IPISC)
of included patents. This information forms the basis for our empirical analysis.
According to the policy, reimbursements are available only for costs incurred to defend against insured
patents, both by contesting allegations of infringement in court and by petitioning the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB) to reconsider the validity of insured patents. The policy expressly excludes
coverage for judgments or settlements. Policy limits range from $250,000 to $1 million, with policy
terms set at one year. These policy limits are comparable to the contemporary median cost ($850,000)
of defending a moderately complex patent suit filed by an NPE (i.e., one with between $1 million and
$10 million at stake) and the median cost ($250,000) of challenging a patent’s validity before the PTAB
28IPISC was founded in 1990 and has sold general litigation defense insurance (not targeted at NPEs) for many years.
29Insurance for patents listed in Menu 2 cannot be purchased separately from Menu 1 – i.e., if a company wishes to
purchase coverage for Menu 2, it must also purchase coverage for Menu 1.
17
(AIPLA, 2017). Premiums for coverage against patents listed in Menu 1 range from $2,200 to $19,500
depending on characteristics of the purchaser, and insured parties must additionally pay a deductible
set at 2% of their policy limit and thereafter 10% coinsurance. Premiums for coverage against patents
listed on both menus vary between $3,000 and $24,500. The deductible and co-insurance for this second
package are larger as well, with both set at 20%.
3.2 Data Construction
To study this policy’s effect, we assemble a database with three key components. First, we construct
the patent portfolios of all NPEs that hold an insured patent, as well as the portfolios of their parents,
subsidiaries, and affiliates. Second, we identify all NPE patent infringement suits filed 2010–2016 and all
PTAB validity challenges filed during the same period30 that challenge an NPE-owned patent. Third, we
collect basic information about the companies sued for patent infringement in the NPE cases identified
above.
3.2.1 NPE Patent Portfolios
To construct a database of patents for use in our empirical analysis, we begin by identifying each insured
patent’s owner and all entities affiliated with each owner. Together, the two menus covered by IPISC’s
“troll defense” policy include a total of 307 patents that were owned during the period of our study by a
total of 158 unique NPEs,31 many of which in turn share common corporate parents. Firms specializing
in patent assertion commonly distribute (and perhaps obfuscate) ownership of their patent portfolios
across a number of subsidiaries (Ewing and Feldman, 2012), some of which own no more than a single
patent family or even a single patent. Accordingly, relying on information obtained from RPX, Inc.,32
we consolidate the 158 immediate owners of insured patents into 78 NPE groups. Of these 78 ultimate
owners, 28 are independent entities with no subsidiaries, while 50 are parents that control a network of
patent-holding LLCs.33
With each insured patent’s true owner identified, we next determine whether each entity owns any
uninsured patents. Again relying on RPX’s database of patent-asserting entities, we identify a total of
436 entities affiliated with the 78 NPE groups that hold at least one insured patent. To reconstruct the
patent portfolios of these 436 entities, we proceed as follows. We first use the names of these entities
to extract from the European Patent Office’s Patstat database (version April 2017) the numbers of all
30PTAB validity challenges were not available prior to September 16, 2012.
31On their face, IPISC’s menus list 105 patent owners, two of which we exclude because they are not NPEs. We expand
this list of 103 NPEs to 158 because several insured patents were transferred within a group of related NPEs during the
period of our analysis, and we include in our analysis all NPEs that held insured patents at any relevant point (55 of which
were not listed by name on either menu).
32Specifically, we used RPX’s Entity Search, available online at https://search.rpxcorp.com/advanced_search/search_
entities.
33Some entities are controlled not by a corporate parent, but instead by an individual (often the inventor of the asserted
patents).
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patents assigned to each entity. Because NPEs often acquire the patents that they assert and such
acquisitions are often not reflected in Patstat, we also search both the USPTO’s re-assignment database
(Marco et al., 2015) and RPX’s database of NPE patent holdings to identify any additional patents
transferred to each entity.34 Next, we search U.S. District Court and PTAB dockets to identify any
additional patents enforced or challenged in proceedings to which any of the 436 entities was a party.
Figure 3: Example of Portfolio Construction – Acacia Research Corp.
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Having identified the entity that directly holds any insured patents and all other patents in their
portfolio, as well as all other entities that belong to the same NPE group and their patent portfolios
allows us to construct different sets of patents that we can compare to the set of insured patents:
Comparison Group 1: Cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by any of 158 specific entities
listed by IPISC enforcing insured patents.
Comparison Group 2: Cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by any of the 436 entities
affiliated with the 78 affected NPE groups, including the uninsured patents in Comparison Group
1.
Comparison Group 1 allows us to compare changes in assertions between insured and uninsured patents
for a given NPE and, thus, account for time-invariant unobservable NPE characteristics in addition to
patent characteristics. However, a potential concern with this comparison group is the possibility that
insurance affects assertion of both insured and uninsured patents held by the same NPE. Comparison
Group 2 mitigates this concern by including patents asserted by other NPEs within the same NPE
groups.
To provide one concrete example of our methodology, consider Acacia Research Corp., the publicly-
traded corporate parent of a large network of NPEs. We depict our portfolio construction process for
Acacia in Figure 3. During the period of our study, 18 Acacia subsidiaries held a total of 19 insured
34For Intellectual Ventures (IV), which has a notoriously complex patent ownership structure (Ewing and Feldman,
2012), we relied instead on the list of patents published on IV’s own website: http://patents.intven.com/finder.
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patents. In addition to these 19 insured patents, the same 18 subsidiaries collectively held 1,193 uninsured
patents (1,052 of which were acquired prior to the launch of IPISC’s policy). Also, in addition to the
18 subsidiaries that held insured patents, Acacia controls another 167 subsidiaries that collectively held
1,142 more uninsured patents (1,064 of which were acquired before the policy’s introduction). In our
main analysis below, we compare the assertion of Acacia’s 19 insured patents with the assertion of the
1,052 uninsured patents held by the same subsidiaries (Comparison Group 1) before the insurance was
launched, as well as the assertion of Acacia’s entire portfolio of uninsured patents across all subsidiaries
(Comparison Group 2) before the insurance was launched. In additional analysis, we also explore patent
acquisitions and their assertions following the launch of the insurance policy.
Finally, for each patent that we identify as belonging to an NPE’s portfolio, we extract basic bibli-
ographic information from Patstat and determine whether the patent had been declared essential to a
technology standard (Bekkers et al., 2012). Apart from standard patent characteristics such as family
size and citations, we also include two measures of patent scope. We use the number of words used in
the shortest independent claim and the total number of independent claims as proposed by Marco et al.
(2019).35
3.2.2 Litigation Data
Next, we merge our database of NPE patent portfolios with case-level data (sourced from MaxVal
Group, Inc. and Docket Navigator)36 to identify all U.S. patent suits filed between 2010 and 2016 that
assert a patent held by an affected NPE. We restrict our litigation data to cases filed through 2016 in
order to avoid truncation issues caused by (often lengthy) case pendency, and we collect case outcome
data through January 2020 for our settlement analysis. We add information on administrative validity
challenges (sourced from Unified Patents, Inc.) in the form of petitions for inter partes review (IPR) and
covered business method (CBM) review at the PTAB. To ensure that each litigated patent was owned
by an affected NPE at the time of suit, we cross-reference litigation dates with USPTO re-assignment
records that indicate when patents were acquired or sold.37 Because NPEs tend to acquire and sell
patents often, for most of our analysis we fix NPE patent portfolios at the time of the insurance policy’s
launch. That is, we only consider patents in each comparison group that were acquired before May 2014
and ignore patents that were sold before May 2014 (see also the Acacia example above in Figure 3).
However, in Section 5.4 below, we also analyze affected NPEs’ post-insurance patent transactions and
35Marco et al. (2019) present evidence suggesting that both metrics are related to patent value and quality. Also,
intuitively, patents with broader scope are both (i) more likely to be infringed and, thus, perhaps more likely to be asserted
(because they are more likely to capture after-arising technology) and (ii) more likely to be invalidated once asserted
(because they are more likely to overlap with preexisting technology that may be discovered in the course of litigation).
36MaxVal’s Litigation Databank is available at https://www.maxval.com/litigation-database-services.html, and
Docket Navigator is available at http://brochure.docketnavigator.com.
37Our analysis includes assertions of patents that were re-assigned within an NPE group, e.g., between two Acacia
subsidiaries. At this step, we exclude only cases filed after a relevant patent was re-assigned to an unrelated, third party
NPE that was named as the plaintiff in court.
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associated district court litigation.
Finally, for use in constructing additional comparison groups, we collect data on the patents asserted,
and cases filed, by a large number of NPEs with portfolios that were not affected by IPISC’s policy. To
compile this list, we use and extend the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset, which identifies all patent
suits filed by NPEs in the U.S. between 2000 and 2015 and links those suits with case-level data sourced
from Lex Machina, Inc. (Miller et al., 2017).38 To ensure comparability between assertions by NPEs
that hold insured patents and other NPEs, we limit our use of the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset to
cases filed by PAEs.39 We use this set of patents to construct a third comparison group:
Comparison Group 3: Cases brought by other NPEs that do not hold any insured patents.
Comparison Group 3, which contains patents held by NPEs not directly affected by the insurance (i.e.,
included neither in Comparison Group 1 nor Comparison Group 2), helps address concerns with Com-
parison Groups 1 and 2 that insurance affects assertion of both insured and uninsured patents held by
the same NPE or NPE group.
3.2.3 Defendant Data
Finally, we source firm-level data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis dataset for companies sued by NPEs
between 2010 and 2016. Our litigation data includes a total of 5,890 unique defendants (including those
sued by NPEs that were unaffected by IPISC’s policy). We are able to match 92% of these company
names to company names in Orbis and extract a number of basic company characteristics, including SIC
code, firm size, whether the company is part of a business group, and country of incorporation.
4 Insurance Selection
With our database complete, we next examine the selection of patents into the insurance policy. In
interviews with IPISC executives, we learned that the insurer did not perform sophisticated forecasting
of future NPE assertions or otherwise rely on unobservable characteristics of patents or their owners.
Instead, IPISC selected insured patents primarily using two observable criteria: (a) the number of times
that patents had been asserted in court in the past, and (b) an assessment of patents’ quality. With
respect to prior litigation activity, IPISC stated that it wanted to include patents that had been actively
38The dataset and a paper describing its creators’ methodology and patent owner taxonomy is available at https:
//law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-npe-litigation-dataset. Because construction of the Stanford NPE dataset
is an ongoing process, we extend the Stanford dataset’s coverage through 2016 by hand-collecting data (using the same
methodology employed by the Stanford dataset’s creators) for all U.S. patent cases filed that year. The data for 2010–2016
that we use contains assertions by 1,211 NPEs that are not associated with any of the 78 NPE groups that hold insured
patents.
39Nearly all NPEs that hold insured patents are so-called “patent assertion entities” (PAEs) – that is, business entities
that specialize in patent enforcement – as opposed to universities, individuals, patent-holding subsidiaries of operating
technology companies, and other types of (technically) non-practicing patent holders that are included in the Stanford
NPE Litigation Dataset.
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asserted in order to make the policy attractive to potential customers. With respect to quality, IPISC
stated that it also sought to assemble a group of patents that were reasonably vulnerable to validity
challenges. More specifically, IPISC indicated that it tracked prior rulings on the validity of candidate
patents and excluded patents that had already survived two or more challenges.
In Figure 4, we depict the legal status of insured patents. We see that the majority of patents remained
in force throughout the entire period observed in our data. The figure also shows that a relatively large
number of patents have been challenged through reexamination, IPR, or CBM and in most cases survived
the challenge (though in some instances with a subset of claims invalidated).40 Moreover, there are a
number of patents that were invalidated in their entirety, or that expired or lapsed due to non-payment
of renewal fees even before the insurance entered into force.41
Figure 4: Legal Status of Insured Patents
Insurance
2010m1 2012m1 2014m1 2016m1
In force Invalidated Lapsed
Partly invalidated Valid Settled
Notes: The graph plots the legal status of insured patents taking into account administrative invalidity challenges
available pre- as well as post-America Invents Act. Each bar shown in the graph represents an insured patent.
Note that an x in January 2010 means that there was a validity challenge prior to January 2010.
In Table 2, we compare insured patents to uninsured patents held by the same 78 NPE groups
(Comparison Group 2) as well as all other NPEs (Comparison Group 3) to better understand any
selection based on observable patent characteristics into insurance (for an overview of all the patent
characteristics used see appendix B). The comparison also distinguishes between patents that were and
were not asserted in court before the insurance became available. Perhaps the most salient result from
Table 2 is the age of insured patents.42 While insured patents are, on the whole, relatively old (with an
40For the purposes of this figure, we complemented the data described in Section 3 with information on two, older forms
of administrative patent challenges: ex parte and inter partes reexamination.
41We take information on invalidations into account in our analysis in Section 5.1. Before December 2013, patents could
only be revived within a two-year window after they lapsed for non-payment. However, since December 2013, patents can
be revived at any point, which makes a lapse for non-payment hard to interpret. In fact, four of the lapsed patents in
Figure 4 were asserted in court after they had lapsed. Although this was raised by the defendants sued in those cases, we
do not know its impact because the cases settled quickly.
42By age we mean years of the patent’s term of protection that elapsed by 2016. Thus, for patents issued from applications
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average of just 3 years of statutory life remaining), this is consistent with prior studies finding that NPEs
disproportionately assert older patents (Love, 2013).43 In addition, because the U.S. Patent Act provides
for a six-year statute of limitations (35 U.S.C. §286), patents can be enforced to recover damages for
past infringement well after their expiration date. The table also reveals that most insured patents were
indeed enforced at some point, while only a small subset was subject to a PTAB invalidation challenge
in form of an IPR or CBM, and very few patents are declared standard essential.44
Table 2 also addresses potential concerns about the impact of two U.S. Supreme Court cases issued
during the period that we study. First, the variable “Fee award” presents the share of patents that were
asserted in a patent suit in which the court awarded attorney fees to the accused infringer pursuant
to section 285 of the U.S. Patent Act (35 U.S.C. §285).45 This variable captures the possibility that
the Supreme Court’s April 2014 decision in Octance Fitness LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness LLC 46
could confound our results if assertions of insured patents were affected more by the Octance decision
than assertions of uninsured patents.47 For example, if insured patents are relatively weaker than their
uninsured counterparts, defendants may be less likely to settle post-Octance and, thus, more likely to
litigate the case to a decision and, potentially thereafter, an attorney fee award. If so, this could lead
NPEs to assert insured patents less often post-Octance regardless of insurance. The table shows that
insured patents were indeed slightly more likely to be asserted in cases that resulted in fee shifting.
Likewise, there is also a potential concern that the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2014 decision in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank may have affected insured and uninsured patents differently and, thus,48 could have
reduced assertions of insured patents regardless of insurance. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the Court
restricted the patentability of algorithms implemented in software, particularly the ability to patent
generic computer implementations of algorithms that pre-date modern computing. To account for this
concern, we create a dummy variable that is equal to one for business method and software patents as
defined by Chung et al. (2015).49 Again, we see that the share of business method and software patents
is indeed slightly larger among insured than uninsured patents.
filed on or after June 8, 1995, we compute age as the difference between 2016 and the filing date of the earliest application to
which the patent claims priority. The duration of patents issued from applications filed before June 8, 1995 is complicated
by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Love, 2018). Thus, for these patents, we calculate age as the shorter of (i)
the difference between 2016 and the filing date of the earliest application to which the patent claims priority, or (ii) the
difference between 2016 and the date on which the patent issued.
43Indeed, it is a common enforcement strategy among NPEs to delay assertion until potential infringers have made large,
fixed investments in the patented technology, or are otherwise “locked in” to the technology such that switching to an
alternative would be especially costly (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007).
44While NPEs commonly sue implementers of standardized technology, they rarely assert (declared) standard-essential
patents (SEPs) in such cases. According to Contreras (2017), a total of 26 NPEs enforced just 164 U.S. SEPs between
January 2000 and July 2015.
45The details of the data collection are described in online appendix C.
46Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
47Prior to the Court’s decision in Octane, a case was considered “exceptional” on the merits only if the case was both
“objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.” In Octane, the Court rejected this “unduly rigid” test and held
that an exceptional case is “simply one that stands out from others.” This new, flexible standard significantly expanded
district courts’ discretion to award litigation costs in patent suits, and thus effectively increased the likelihood that the
winning party would be able to obtain such an award.
48Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
49We follow Chung et al. (2015) and define business method and software patents as those in USPC main classes 341,
345, 370, 380, 382, 700-707, 710, 711, 713-715, 717, 726, and 902.
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Overall, comparing the complete set of insured with uninsured patents held by affected NPE groups
(Comparison Group 2) reveals that insured patents are on average only slightly older than uninsured
patents (i.e., they have less statutory patent life left). However, insured patents fare better under
standard metrics for patent value, such as the number of forward citations received, family size, and
number of independent claims. Insured patents also are more likely to be essential to a technology
standard. In addition, insured patents are much more likely to be asserted in court and challenged at
the PTAB pre-insurance in line with the selection criteria reported directly by IPISC. This suggests that
the patents included in the insurance policy are, as expected, not a random selection of patents held by
the NPEs.
However, when limiting the comparison to uninsured patents that were asserted before the insurance
policy’s launch, the differences identified above become much smaller, with some statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Relative to previously asserted uninsured patents, insured patents are slightly
younger, come from patent families of similar sizes, have similar independent claim counts, have been
identified as essential to a technology standard roughly as often, and have been challenged fewer times
before the PTAB. This suggests that selection occurs into assertion – that is, the set of patents that
are asserted differs from the set of patents that are never asserted – a reality long recognized by patent
system observers (Allison et al., 2004; Marco, 2005; Marco and Miller, 2017).
To further investigate the relative importance of prior assertions for patent selection, in Table 3
we present the results of a logit model to estimate the probability that a given patent is covered by
the insurance policy. We present results for the patents in each of our three comparison groups in
specifications (1) through (3). Across all specifications, we use the same variables as in Table 2 and add
technology fixed effects (based on a patent’s main IPC). In all specifications, we see a positive correlation
between inclusion in the insurance policy and counts of forward citations, SEP coverage, and (consistent
with information disclosed to us by IPISC) pre-insurance assertions in court. Last, comparing insured
patents to uninsured patents in Comparison Group 3, we see that insured patents are less likely to have
been challenged at the PTAB than uninsured patents held by unaffected NPEs.
5 Results
5.1 Patent Assertion
For our first set of results, we study the effect of the insurance policy on the litigation behavior of NPEs.
Our theoretical framework predicts a decrease in the number of assertions in response to the introduction
of the policy (Prediction 1).
Simple descriptive analyses provide a first glimpse. The left-hand-side plot in Figure 5 shows the
number of assertions of insured and uninsured patents held by the 76 NPE groups (of a total of 78
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Table 2: Comparison of Patent Characteristics
All patents
Insured Uninsured
Variable Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. Diff means
Age 16.648 18 5.041 307 15.795 16 4.186 22,810 0.852**
Remaining patent term 3.208 3 4.518 307 5.049 5 4.264 22,810 -1.840***
Family size 7.583 5 8.138 307 4.691 3 6.411 22,810 2.891***
Forward citations 69.990 31 104.213 307 27.735 12 54.140 22,810 42.254***
Backward citations 46.576 27 41.906 307 30.601 16 33.780 22,810 15.974***
NPL citations 25.749 4 37.002 307 9.419 1 20.608 22,810 16.329***
SEP 0.055 0 0.229 307 0.002 0 0.049 22,810 0.052***
Fee award† 0.039 0 0.194 307 0.001 0 0.028 22,810 0.038***
Business method/software 0.693 1 0.461 307 0.482 0 0.499 22,810 0.211***
Independent claim length 127.804 111 66.679 302 134.690 119 76.573 21,165 -6.885
Independent claims count 5.052 4 4.241 302 3.701 3 3.019 21,165 1.351***
Asserted in court 0.830 1 0.375 307 0.041 0 0.199 22,810 0.788***
Challenged at PTAB† 0.130 0 0.337 307 0.007 0 0.084 22,810 0.123***
Asserted patents (assertion before insurance became available)
Insured Uninsured
Variable Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. Diff means
Age 17.329 18 4.662 249 18.170 19 3.554 803 -0.841***
Remaining patent term 2.646 2 4.166 249 2.212 2 3.400 803 0.433*
Family size 7.152 5 7.725 249 7.672 5 10.835 803 -0.519
Forward citations 77.277 40 111.477 249 63.894 31 95.399 803 -13.382*
Backward citations 43.502 24 39.725 249 34.917 21 32.851 803 8.584***
NPL citations 26.104 4 37.265 249 10.488 1 22.200 803 15.616***
SEP 0.016 0 0.125 249 0.011 0 0.105 803 0.004
Fee award† 0.048 0 0.214 249 0.016 0 0.126 803 0.032***
Business method/software 0.775 1 0.418 249 0.547 1 0.498 803 0.227***
Independent claim length 132.461 113 68.619 249 121.297 109 65.034 801 11.164**
Independent claims count 5.184 4 4.230 249 4.915 4 6.164 801 0.269
# assertions in court† 20.823 8 39.486 249 5.800 2 10.849 803 15.022***
Challenged at PTAB† 0.160 0 0.367 249 0.196 0 0.397 803 -0.036
Asserted patents (assertion before insurance became available)
Insured Uninsured – all other NPEs
Variable Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. Diff means
Age 17.329 18 4.662 249 17.383 18 4.165 1,988 0.054
Remaining patent term 2.646 2 4.166 249 3.057 3 4.106 1,988 -0.411
Family size 7.152 5 7.725 249 7.259 4 10.292 1,988 -0.106
Forward citations 77.277 40 111.477 249 39.319 15 78.075 1,988 37.957***
Backward citations 43.502 24 39.725 249 35.155 20 35.921 1,988 8.346***
NPL citations 26.104 4 37.265 249 14.006 2 26.941 1,988 12.098***
SEP 0.016 0 0.125 249 0.017 0 0.129 1,988 -0.001
Fee award† 0.048 0 0.214 249 0.017 0 0.129 1,988 0.031***
Business method/software 0.775 1 0.418 249 0.478 1 0.499 1,988 0.296***
Independent claim length 132.461 113 68.619 249 134.953 119 74.359 1,979 -2.491
Independent claims count 5.184 4 4.230 249 4.419 3 4.138 1,979 0.764***
# assertions in court† 20.823 8 39.486 249 4.312 1 10.049 1,988 16.510***
Challenged at PTAB† 0.160 0 0.367 249 0.187 0 0.390 1,988 -0.026
Notes: Insured patents include patents from both Menu 1 and Menu 2; SD: standard deviation; remaining patent
term computed as difference between patent age in 2016 and statutory patent term where for applications filed
on or after June 8, 1995 patent age is computed as the difference between priority date and 2016 and statutory
patent life is 20 years counting from the priority date – for applications filed before June 8, 1995 patent age is
computed as the shorter of (i) the difference between 2016 and the filing date of the earliest application to which
the patent claims priority, or (ii) the difference between 2016 and the date on which the patent issued where
statutory patent term is 20 years for (i) counting from the priority date and 17 years for (ii) counting from the
date of issuance; Forward citations within first 3 years of earliest publication; NPL: non-patent literature; SEP:
standard essential patent (0/1); Fee award: equal to one if patent was subject to a fee award under section 285
of the U.S. Patent Act; Business method/software: equal to one if patent is in USPC main classes 341, 345, 370,
380, 382, 700-707, 710, 711, 713-715, 717, 726, and 902; Independent claim length: the number of words used
in the shortest independent claim; Independent claims count: the total number of independent claims; † defined
over the sample period before the insurance policy became available; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Patent-Level Determinants of Policy Coverage
Insured vs. Uninsured
Same NPEs Other NPEs
Comparison 1 Comparison 2 Comparison 3
(1) (2) (3)
ln age -0.004 -0.005* -0.073***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.017)
ln family size 0.007*** 0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
ln forward citations 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.025***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.003)
ln backward citations -0.0005 -0.0008 0.011**
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.005)
ln NPL citations 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.004)
SEP 0.264*** 0.202*** 0.187***
(0.059) (0.048) (0.052)
Fee award† 0.091 0.065 0.009
(0.116) (0.076) (0.042)
Business method/software† -0.002 -0.003* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012)
ln independent claim length -0.001 -0.001 -0.023**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009)
Independent claims count 0.001** 0.0009** 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001)
# assertions in court† 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0006)
Challenged at PTAB† 0.220*** 0.113*** -0.061***
(0.051) (0.034) (0.013)
Technology FE YES YES YES
Observations 21,177 23,117 3,412
Insured patents 307 307 307
R2 0.205 0.166 0.175
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable = 1 if patent included in insurance policy. Insured patents include patents from both
Menu 1 and Menu 2; NPL: non-patent literature; SEP: standard essential patent (0/1); Fee award: equal to one if patent was
subject to a fee award under section 285 of the U.S. Patent Act; Business method/software: equal to one if patent is in USPC
main classes 341, 345, 370, 380, 382, 700-707, 710, 711, 713-715, 717, 726, and 902; Independent claim length: the number of
words used in the shortest independent claim; Independent claims count: the total number of independent claims; † defined over
the sample period before the insurance policy became available; all regressions include a dummy variable that is equal to one if ln
independent claim length or Independent claims count are missing; robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at
1%.
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NPE groups affected by the policy, i.e., Comparison Group 2) that have filed at least one suit since the
policy’s introduction in May 2014 (indicated by the vertical red bar).50 The figure suggests a general
increase in NPE patent assertions beginning in 2011,51 with a subsequent downward trend starting in
mid-2013. This latter shift may be attributable to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari and subsequent
decision restricting software patentability in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. For our purposes, it is sufficient to
highlight that the overall litigation pattern between insured and uninsured patents held by the set of 76
NPE groups follows a similar trend until the introduction of IPISC’s insurance policy in mid-2014. Once
insurance was introduced, assertions for the subset of insured patents dropped further and eventually
reached a lower level than assertions of uninsured patents. For comparison, the right-hand-side plot in
Figure 5 compares assertions of insured patents with assertions by other NPEs that do not hold any
insured patents (Comparison Group 3). While the total number of assertions by other NPEs is larger –
as expected due to the large number of enforcing entities – at least until mid-2013, they follow a similar
trend compared to assertions of insured patents. Once insurance becomes available, assertions by other
NPEs continue unaffected while assertions of insured patents drop considerably.
Figure 5: Number of Court Cases Asserting Insured vs. Uninsured Patents
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Notes: Insured patents contain all asserted patents from Menu 1 and Menu 2; the comparison group in the
left-hand-side graph consists of all other asserted patents held by the same NPE groups that hold the insured
patents (Comparison Group 2); the comparison group in the right-hand-side graph consists of other NPEs that
do not hold any insured patents (Comparison Group 3). Data series have been smoothed using local polynomial
smoothing.
To further explore what drives the aggregate results shown in Figure 5, we plot the number of patent
assertions per month for each NPE group in Figures A-2 and A-3 in the appendix. Figure A-2 (for
50The data series shown in Figure 5 was smoothed using a local polynomial smoother. The underlying, unsmoothed data
is shown in Figure A-1 in the appendix.
51Note that some of this increase is an artifact of changes to joinder rules applicable in patent cases that now prohibit
patent holders from joining multiple, unrelated defendants in a single lawsuit (Cotropia et al., 2014).
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insured patents) shows that most NPEs were actively asserting their patents in 2012 and 2013, but
ceased to do so towards the end of 2014, following introduction of IPISC’s policy. That said, a few NPEs
continued to assert patents covered by the IPISC policy, especially CTP, Hawk Technology Systems, and
NPEs controlled by IPNav and Scott Horstemeyer. Two of these NPEs, Hawk Technology Systems and
Scott Horstemeyer, together account for more than half of all post-insurance assertions. For comparison,
Figure A-3 shows that assertions of uninsured patents (Comparison Group 3) are (relative to the data
shown in Figure A-2) more numerous in 2014 and early 2015 following the introduction of insurance.
For a more formal regression analysis of the changes in patent assertions following the introduction
of the insurance policy, we construct for each of our three comparison groups, a matched comparison
group using one-to-one propensity score matching without replacement based on a list of observable
patent characteristics: patent age, family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations,
SEP status, the number of words used in the shortest independent claim (independent claim length),
the total number of independent claims (independent claims count), 35 technology classes derived from
IPC codes, and dummy variables indicating whether a patent was subject to (i) a PTAB challenge prior
to the launch of the insurance policy, (ii) a fee award under section 285 of the U.S. Patent Act prior to
the launch of the insurance policy, and (iii) whether a patent is a software or business method patent as
defined by Chung et al. (2015).
Table 4 compares the average number of assertions before and after the insurance policy became
available for the set of insured patents and each comparison sample. The upper panel shows statistics at
the case-level whereas the lower panel shows statistics at the patent-level. The table shows that insured
patents were collectively asserted in slightly more than 44 court cases per month on average before the
insurance became available, after which the average drops to just 20 cases per month. The difference
between these two means is statistically significant at 1 percent. When we look at Comparison Group 1,
we see that the average number of court cases remains unchanged after the introduction of the insurance,
whereas the average number of assertions per month drops significantly when considering the extended
Comparison Group 2. Finally, the average number of assertions per month by non-associated NPEs
(Comparison Group 3) increases significantly, a pattern observed in Figure 5. When instead considering
the number of assertions per patent per month in the lower panel of Table 4, we see that the average
number of assertions again drops significantly for both insured patents and the uninsured patents in
Comparison Group 2.
To analyze changes in litigation behavior through a regression, we start by specifying equation (15),
where we regress: the log of the total number of patent assertions per month (lncaset), (i) on a dummy
(0/1) variable that is equal to one for all assertions of an insured patent (Insured), (ii) a dummy variable
that indicates when the insurance became available (Postlauncht) which is equal to one from May 2014
onward, and (iii) their interaction (Insured × Postlauncht):
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Table 4: Comparison of Court Case Counts Between Insured and Uninsured Patents
Number of court cases (per month)
Before After
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Diff in means
Insured
Insured 44.461 45 31.712 20.093 15 13.155 24.367***
Uninsured
Comparison Group 1a 12.519 10 9.912 14.656 12 11.258 -2.137
Comparison Group 1b 2.519 1 3.780 3.406 0 6.767 -0.887
Comparison Group 2a 39.307 40.5 28.277 25.156 22.5 15.577 14.151**
Comparison Group 2b 5.250 2 6.967 4.843 2.5 6.792 0.406
Comparison Group 3a 77.307 62 53.919 105.000 83.5 61.906 -27.692**
Comparison Group 3b 16.000 10.5 20.142 16.656 10.5 20.392 -0.656
Number of court cases (per month) at the patent level
Before After
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Diff in means
Insured
Insured 0.391 0 2.144 0.125 0 0.991 0.265***
Uninsured
Comparison Group 1a 0.066 0 0.569 0.080 0 0.914 -0.013
Comparison Group 1b 0.076 0 0.656 0.100 0 1.045 -0.023**
Comparison Group 2a 0.094 0 0.932 0.057 0 0.677 0.037***
Comparison Group 2b 0.092 0 0.857 0.080 0 0.820 0.011
Comparison Group 3a 0.053 0 0.719 0.059 0 0.749 -0.006
Comparison Group 3b 0.073 0 1.144 0.075 0 1.110 -0.002
Notes: Insured patents include patents from both Menu 1 and Menu 2; Comparison 1: comparison group consists
of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison
2: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPE groups
that the NPEs that hold insured patents belong to; Comparison 3: comparison group consists of court cases
brought by NPEs that do not belong to “insured NPE groups;” matched comparison groups consist of patents
matched based on the patent characteristics described in the text (patent age, family size, forward citations,
backward citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, business method/software patent, independent claim length,
independent claims count, PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based on IPC codes) using propensity
score one-to-one matching without replacement. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 5: Total Number of Court Cases
Comparison 1 Comparison 2 Comparison 3
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
All Matched All Matched All Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insured patent 1.174*** 2.697*** 0.117* 2.222*** -0.581*** 1.035***
(0.098) (0.111) (0.064) (0.105) (0.070) (0.088)
Post-launch -0.425 -0.808 -1.207*** -0.769*** -0.783*** -2.127**
(0.285) (0.545) (0.124) (0.258) (0.193) (0.852)
Insured patent× -0.835*** -0.629** -0.352*** -0.612*** -1.092*** -0.680***
Post-launch (0.158) (0.255) (0.131) (0.222) (0.156) (0.193)
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
R2 0.852 0.724 0.890 0.892 0.885 0.770
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable: log number of cases by month. All regressions include a constant. Time period is
January 2010 – December 2016; Comparison 1: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted
by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison 2: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents
were asserted by the same NPE groups that the NPEs that hold insured patents belong to; Comparison 3: comparison group
consists of court cases brought by NPEs that do not belong to “insured NPE groups;” for all comparison groups, we have matched
the most similar patents that belong to all other NPEs to the set of insured patents based on the patent characteristics described in
the text (patent age, family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, business method/software
patent, independent claim length, independent claims count, PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based on IPC codes) using
propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement. Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
lncaset = β0 + β1Insured + β2Postlauncht + β3Insured × Postlauncht + δt + εt, (15)
where δt are month dummies. Specification (15) asks whether the number of assertions per month for
insured patents changes relative to uninsured patents following the introduction of the insurance policy.
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS regression in specification (15). When we use insured patents
held by the same NPEs for comparison in columns (1) and (2), we see that the set of insured patents
is associated with a significantly larger number of assertions than uninsured patents. The post-launch
dummy variable is not statistically significant. The interaction term is negative, indicating that the
number of assertions falls significantly by between 46 and 56 percent for the set of insured patents after
the insurance is introduced. These results hold both when we use all uninsured patents (as in column
(1)) and when we match each insured patent to its most similar uninsured patent (as shown in column
(2)). In Columns (3) and (4), we additionally take into account uninsured patents held by other NPEs
within the same NPE group (Comparison Group 2). The interaction term in columns (3) and (4) is
still negative but smaller in magnitude (compared to the terms in (1) and (2)), implying a drop in the
number of assertions by 30–45 percent. The results for Comparison Group 3 likewise suggest a large
negative effect of the insurance policy on assertions of insured patents of between 50 and 66 percent.
Next, we run specification (15) at the patent-level which allows us to include patent-level fixed effects
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Table 6: Total Number of Court Cases at the Patent-Level
Comparison 1 Comparison 2 Comparison 3
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
All Matched All Matched All Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-launch -0.012*** -0.020 -0.037*** -0.027 -0.012** -0.047**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) (0.022)
Insured patent× -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.087*** -0.087***
Post-launch (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Patent FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 54,615 42,687 101,067 42,687 282,171 42,687
R2 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.0008 0.009
Notes: OLS FE regression. Dependent variable: log number of cases by patent-month. All regressions include a constant. Time
period is January 2010 – December 2016; Comparison 1: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were
asserted by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison 2: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured
patents were asserted by the same NPE groups that the NPEs that hold insured patents belong to; Comparison 3: comparison group
consists of court cases brought by NPEs that do not belong to “insured NPE groups;” for all comparison groups, we have matched
the most similar patents that belong to all other NPEs to the set of insured patents based on the patent characteristics described in
the text (patent age, family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, business method/software
patent, independent claim length, independent claims count, PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based on IPC codes) using
propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement. Robust standard errors clustered at the patent-level. * significant at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
and thus analyze changes in assertions for insured relative to uninsured patents:
lncaseit = β0 + β1Insured i + β2Postlauncht +
β3Insured i × Postlauncht + αi + δt + εit, (16)
where lncaseit denotes the log of the number of assertions of patent i in month t, αi denotes patent-level
fixed effects, and the rest of specification (16) is as defined in specification (15) above.52
Table 6 shows the corresponding results. The interaction term captures the difference-in-differences
estimate of the insurance effect. The estimated coefficient is negative across all samples, suggesting
that assertions for insured patents fell following the introduction of the insurance while accounting for
unobservable, time-invariant patent-specific characteristics and a time trend.
This result comports with the findings in our theoretical model (Prediction 1) where we have shown
how the availability of defensive litigation insurance lowers the number of patent assertions (i.e., court
cases). Likewise, our approach should adequately address concerns about selection into insurance cov-
erage to the extent that it is driven by observable differences between patents, which is consistent with
the information we obtained from IPISC about their selection of patents for inclusion in the policy.
That said, there could nonetheless exist some omitted unobservable patent characteristics that are cor-
related with insurance coverage. For example, some patents’ claims may exhibit not-readily-quantifiable
linguistic differences that could lead to more assertions.
52Note that the specification does not include court dummies because there is a concern that these court dummies are
‘bad controls’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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Accordingly, as a robustness check we perform a randomization test similar to Alsan et al. (2019).
Under the null hypothesis that insurance has no effect, we estimate the distribution of the difference in
case filings between insured and uninsured patents by randomly allocating insurance across all patents
in the sample (10,000 times). We then compare the outcome which we would expect to see if the
null hypothesis were true to the observed outcome obtained from the actual data. This allows us to
ask how likely the observed outcome is by computing the share of placebo estimates that exceed the
observed difference. We perform this test in two ways using all insured and uninsured patents held by
all affected NPE groups (Comparison Group 2). First, we randomize treatment within a given NPE
group, holding the number of insured patents constant. For example, if NPE Vertigo has 3 insured and
39 uninsured patents, in each iteration we randomly allocate insurance to 3 patents among the NPE’s
42 total patents. We implement this approach only for NPE groups that hold at least twice as many
uninsured as insured patents, which leaves us with 44 NPE groups (holding 43% of insured patents).
Alternatively, to avoid this limitation, we pool all patents across NPEs and simply allocate insurance
randomly across 294 patents within the combined pool of 4,882 patents (here we exclude Intellectual
Ventures from the sample due its disproportionately large patent portfolio). The corresponding results
are shown in Figure A-4 in the online appendix. In the left-hand-side plot we see that if we randomize
within NPE groups, 97% of placebo estimates are larger than the actual estimate of -0.148. On the right-
hand-side, when we pool all patents, we find that 96% of placebo estimates exceed the actual estimate
of -0.353. Hence, both approaches indicate that the difference between insured and uninsured patents
observed in the actual data is very unlikely due to chance.
5.2 Case Outcomes
Our second set of results is motivated by the well-documented fact that NPEs commonly settle cases
quickly in order to extract licensing payments while avoiding the risk of having their patents invali-
dated. Because NPEs cannot be counter-sued for infringement (by definition, they do not commercialize
technology) and because U.S. courts rarely award fees to prevailing parties (Cotter and Golden, 2018),
non-practicing patentees are often able to leverage the high cost of patent litigation defense to extract
large settlements even in suits asserting patents that are likely invalid.53 Indeed, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (2016) observed in a recent study of the licensing behavior of 22 NPE groups (controlling
327 patent asserting affiliates) that the majority of NPE suits settled quickly, generally within one year,
and most often for amounts below the cost of defending the case to even a preliminary ruling on the
merits.
The predictions from our theory model (Prediction 2) are mixed. We show no effect of the introduction
of the insurance on the settlement rate when the insurance premium varies in firm size. Conversely, when
53According to a survey conducted by the AIPLA (2017), the median cost of defending a relatively small patent suit
filed by an NPE (i.e., one with less than $1 million at stake) is $500,000.
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the insurance premium is uniform (and not contingent on firm size), our model predicts a lower settlement
rate after introduction of the insurance.
We estimate specification (17) which asks whether a court case at t asserting patent i settles as a
function of the insurance coverage:
settleit = β0 + β1Insured i + β2Postlauncht + β3Insured i × Postlauncht + αi + δt + εit. (17)
One concern with the analysis of case outcomes is truncation. Litigation is a lengthy process,54 and
despite having case outcome information through January 2020, some cases in our data remain pending.
To avoid this problem, we include in our settlement analysis only cases that were terminated within
four years of filing. This still covers 98 percent of cases that involve insured patents and 79 percent of
cases involving uninsured patents. Table A-2 in the appendix shows the share of settled cases for insured
and uninsured patents across the different comparison groups before and after the insurance became
available. We observe a small increase in settlements for insured patents. The pattern is less clear with
respect to uninsured patents. Depending on the comparison group, there is an increase or decrease in
the share of settled cases.
We further examine the potential effect of insurance on settlement by comparing settlements in cases
that assert insured patents with settlements in cases that assert uninsured patents. Table 7 shows the
results from estimating equation (17) as a linear probability model. We see no statistically significant
effects across comparison groups of the insurance policy on settlements. That said, the coefficient is
statistically significant in column (6) – i.e., for the matched Comparison Group 3. Still, the evidence
suggests that, overall, the insurance did not have a significant effect on settlement behavior. To probe
this result further, we also distinguish between settlements that occurred at a relatively early stage in
the litigation and settlements that took place after substantial discovery and pre-trial motions practice.
We do so by identifying whether each settlement took place before or after the court’s claim construction
(i.e., Markman) ruling, an important milestone that generally occurs after document production but
before motions for summary judgment. However, adding this distinction has little effect on our results
because approximately 96 percent of settlements in our sample occurred before claim construction.55
5.3 Defendant Size
For our third set of results, we use firm-level data sourced from Orbis to analyze whether the character-
istics of defendants targeted by NPEs changed following the introduction of the insurance. Here, we find
that NPEs targeted SMEs more often following the introduction of the insurance policy.
54According to Lex Machina, for patent cases filed between 2010 and 2014 the median time to summary judgment was
627 days and the median time to trial was 802 days.
55The corresponding results are available upon request.
33
Table 7: Settlement of Court Cases at the Patent Level
Comparison 1 Comparison 2 Comparison 3
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
All Matched All Matched All Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-launch -0.053* -0.056* 0.046 -0.014 -0.100 -0.345
(0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.042) (0.098) (0.123)
Insured patent× 0.024 0.029 -0.051 0.006 0.069 0.301***
Post-launch (0.024) (0.027) (0.033) (0.037) (0.060) (0.104)
Patent FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Court FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,673 7,291 11,176 7,351 17,831 7,261
R2 0.051 0.049 0.008 0.024 0.011 0.082
Notes: OLS FE regression. Dependent variable: case settled (0/1). All regressions include a constant. Time period is January
2010 – December 2016; the sample consists only of cases that were terminated within 4 years after filing; Comparison 1: comparison
group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison
2: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPE groups that the NPEs that
hold insured patents belong to; Comparison 3: comparison group consists of court cases brought by NPEs that do not belong to
“insured NPE groups;” for all comparison groups, we have matched the most similar patents that belong to all other NPEs to the
set of insured patents based on the patent characteristics described in the text (patent age, family size, forward citations, backward
citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, business method/software patent, independent claim length, independent claims count,
PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based on IPC codes) using propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement.
Robust standard errors clustered at patent-level. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Overall, we find that large companies make up about 80 percent of defendants in all NPE cases.
Among cases enforcing insured patents, the share of cases targeting SME defendants increases signifi-
cantly post-insurance, from about 21 percent to 33 percent. In addition, we make a similar observation
about the share of defendants that belong to business groups. Overall, about 75 percent of defendants
in all NPE cases are part of a business group, and while the share of such defendants falls post-insurance
for cases asserting both insured and uninsured patents, the share decreases more in the subset of cases
enforcing insured patents (to 67 percent vs. 72 percent for cases enforcing uninsured patents).
To formally establish these results, we estimate the following equation:
SME t = β0 + β1Insured + β2Postlauncht + β3Insured × Postlauncht + δt + εt, (18)
where SME t denotes the share of cases that have an SME defendant. All other variables in specification
(18) are as in specification (15) above.
Table 8 reports the results from specification (18). As shown in column (3), we find a higher share
of SMEs in lawsuits that involve insured patents compared to uninsured patents held by the same NPE
groups. However, when we use a matched comparison group, the effect (while still positive) is no longer
statistically significant. In columns (5) and (6), we see again that the interaction of insured patents
and the post-launch dummy variable is positive and statistically significant for both the complete and
matched sets of patents. These results suggest that the share of SMEs targeted post-insurance increased
relative to NPEs not directly affected by the insurance. This effect is largely driven by two NPEs,
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Table 8: Share of Court Cases with SME Defendant
Comparison 1 Comparison 2 Comparison 3
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
All Matched All Matched All Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insured patent -0.009 -0.006 0.020 0.0004 0.061*** 0.109***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023)
Post-launch 0.469*** 0.448*** 0.439*** 0.454*** 0.146* 0.289***
(0.068) (0.044) (0.093) (0.080) (0.078) (0.069)
Insured patent× 0.036 0.028 0.079** 0.065 0.173*** 0.115*
Post-launch (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.056) (0.043) (0.059)
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
R2 0.813 0.813 0.820 0.713 0.681 0.628
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable: share of cases with SME defendant by month for a given NPE. All regressions
include a constant. Time period is January 2010 – December 2016; Comparison 1: comparison group consists of court cases in
which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison 2: comparison group consists of
court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPE groups that the NPEs that hold insured patents belong
to; Comparison 3: comparison group consists of court cases brought by NPEs that do not belong to “insured NPE groups;” for all
comparison groups, we have matched the most similar patents that belong to all other NPEs to the set of insured patents based
on the patent characteristics described in the text (patent age, family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations,
SEP, fee award, business method/software patent, independent claim length, independent claims count, PTAB challenge, and 35
technology classes based on IPC codes) using propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement. Robust standard errors.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Hawk and Horstemeyer, which (as shown in Figure A-2 and discussed above) account for the majority
of assertions of insured patents after the insurance becomes available.
Our model provides an explanation for the empirical results. Prediction 3 suggests a lower likelihood
of insurance adoption among smaller companies in the case of an insurance premium structure that is
not sufficiently contingent on size, that means, it is too uniform. Such a premium structure will yield
lower insurance adoption rates, making SMEs relatively more attractive targets (as we find in the data).
5.4 Substitution Effects
Fourth and finally, we examine the “troll defense” policy’s effect on NPEs’ patent sales and acquisitions
and NPEs’ propensity to assert uninsured patents. Given that the NPE business model relies on litigation
(or at least the threat thereof), it is possible that the introduction of insurance may lead some NPEs to
change the set of patents that they assert. We consider this possibility in three ways.
First, we investigate whether affected NPEs sold insured patents after the insurance policy’s launch.
As shown in Figure A-7 in the appendix,56 we see relatively few transactions involving insured patents
following the availability of insurance. While 94 total insured patents changed hands in the three-plus
years preceding the “troll defense” policy, just four insured patents were sold post-insurance. Two of
these passed from one NPE group to another, and two were sold to defensive patent buyers (one to Allied
Security Trust and another to Google via the company’s 2015 “Patent Purchase Promotion”). Table A-3
56Figure A-7 shows all transfers involving insured patents. Note that the data allow us to distinguish between internal
transfers between different entities that belong to the same NPE and external transfers. Our focus here is on external
transfers.
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corroborates more formally the relative infrequency with which insured patents were transferred in the
latter half of 2014 and beyond. To produce the estimates shown in this table, we rely on all patents
in Comparison Group 2 that were re-assigned (bought and/or sold), and ask whether the likelihood of
an insured patent’s sale changed post-insurance. The specifications reported in columns (1) and (2)
of Table A-3 both include as controls the same patent characteristics used above for matching, and in
column (2) we additionally include NPE fixed effects and dummies for the month in which a patent
was acquired. In both specifications, we see that the likelihood that an insured patent is sold drops
significantly post-insurance. These results may indicate that the insurance is successful not only in
deterring assertions, but thereby also in depressing the value of insured patents to the point that they
are effectively neutralized.
Second, we investigate whether affected NPEs may have bought or sold uninsured patents in response
to the insurance.57 As shown in Figure A-8, affected NPEs frequently re-assigned uninsured patents
both before and after the “troll defense” policy’s launch (and commonly did so in large multi-patent
transactions). In the regressions reported in Table A-4, we ask whether there is a change post-insurance
in the likelihood that a given NPE in Comparison Group 2 acquires a new patent (columns (1) and (2))
or sells a patent from its portfolio (columns (3) and (4)) in a given month. All specifications include NPE
and month fixed effects. When we include only the post-launch dummy in the specification reported
in column (1), we find no evidence that patent acquisitions changed following the launch of the policy.
However, when we interact the post-launch dummy with the share of an NPE’s patent portfolio covered
by the insurance (computed as the ratio of insured to total (i.e., insured plus uninsured) patents at the
time the insurance policy was launched in May 2014), we see some evidence indicating that NPEs were
more likely to purchase new patents post-insurance. In contrast, there is no change in either column
(3) or (4) in the likelihood of selling uninsured patents post-insurance. This result could indicate that
NPEs adjust their portfolios by acquiring new patents to assert in place of patents now covered by the
insurance.
Third, we ask whether the frequency with which affected NPEs assert uninsured patents changed
in reaction to the insurance policy. Here, we again look at the set of uninsured patents that affected
NPEs held before the insurance policy was launched in May 2014. Table A-5 in the appendix shows
patent-level regression results where we ask whether the number of uninsured patent assertions per
month changed following the introduction of the insurance. Columns (1) and (3) show results for the
entire sample, and columns (2) and (4) show results for a subset matched to the characteristics of
insured patents. Our matched sample results show that the interaction effects are positive and for
Comparison Group 2 marginally statistically significant. This provides some, albeit weak evidence that
57Given the exceptionally large portfolio held by Intellectual Ventures (>18,000 uninsured patents), we were unable
to verify re-assignments for all of Intellectual Ventures’ uninsured patents since that would require information on all of
Intellectual Ventures’s estimated 13,000 shell companies (Ewing and Feldman, 2012) to distinguish internal and external
transfers. We therefore exclude Intellectual Ventures from this part of the analysis.
36
NPEs could have increased assertions of patents similar to those covered by the insurance. That said,
the post-launch coefficients reported in columns (3) and (4) nonetheless indicate overall a small drop in
post-insurance assertions among uninsured patents. This potential effect is also reflected in Figure A-9
in the appendix, which shows assertions of Comparison Group 2 NPEs’ uninsured patents over time.
The graph distinguishes between assertions of patents held before the insurance was launched and those
acquired afterwards. It also shows that newly acquired patents account for a large number of case filings,
which suggests that NPEs relied more heavily on patents acquired after May 2014 for their subsequent
litigation campaigns.
6 Conclusion
We analyze the extent to which private defensive litigation insurance deters patent assertion by non-
practicing entities (NPEs). We do so by studying the effect of IPISC’s recently launched “troll defense”
insurance, a policy that insures against costs incurred to defend against the enforcement of specific
NPE-owned patents.
First, we model the impact of defensive litigation insurance on the behavior of patent enforcers and
accused infringers. We take a simplified version of the settlement negotiation framework by Bebchuk
(1984) (in which the plaintiff’s win probability in litigation is known only to the defendant) and extend
it by explicitly considering the pricing decision in the (monopolistic) market for insurance policies, the
firm’s decision to purchase insurance, and the NPE’s decision to assert a patent. From the equilibrium
results of the model, we derive three main predictions. First, we find that making insurance available
decreases the likelihood that an NPE brings a patent infringement lawsuit. Second, insurance reduces
the likelihood that a case, once brought, is settled when policies are sold at a uniform insurance premium.
Under contingent pricing, when the insurance premium is a function of firm size, this effect vanishes.
Third, we find ambiguous effects of the availability of insurance on the likelihood that small and medium-
sized firms (SMEs) are the preferred litigation target. With contingent pricing, our model predicts a
decrease in the likelihood that SMEs are the target of litigation, whereas with uniform insurance pricing
(or pricing that is not sufficiently contingent) SMEs are more likely the target.
Next, we empirically evaluate the effect of IPISC’s policy on the owners of insured patents by com-
paring their subsequent assertion of insured patents with their subsequent assertion of other, uninsured
patents in their portfolios. To do so, we identify the true enforcer of each insured patent and all patents
owned and enforced by that entity (and its subsidiaries, if any). We additionally compare the assertion
of insured patents with patents held by other NPEs with portfolios that were entirely excluded from the
insurance product.
We find that the availability of insurance had a large, negative effect on the likelihood that a patent
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included in the policy was subsequently asserted. Moreover, our results are robust across all comparison
groups that we constructed. Accordingly, our findings suggest that NPE patent assertion can be deterred
by the prospect that companies targeted for suit will take advantage of insurance reimbursement to offset
the cost of litigation defense.
This finding has importance for ongoing debates on the need to reform patent systems across the
globe to deter so-called patent “trolling.” Whatever the merits of specific judicial and legislative reforms
presently under consideration, our study suggests that it is also possible for market-based mechanisms
to alter the behavior of patent enforcers. It has been argued that one reason legislative and judicial
reform is needed is because collective action is unlikely to cure the patent system’s ills because defending
against claims of patent infringement generates uncompensated positive externalities. Nonetheless, our
study suggests that defensive litigation insurance may be a viable market-based solution to complement,
or supplant, other reforms that aim to reduce NPE activity.
There is, however, an important limitation to the interpretation of our findings for policy purposes.
Because we do not know which companies purchased insurance coverage, we are unable to distinguish in
our analysis between the direct effect of the policy (i.e., the fact that insured companies are less likely to
be targeted) and the externalities that insurance generates if, unlike in our model, NPEs cannot identify
which companies have coverage. If few firms have purchased the insurance, our results would suggest
that externalities are large. Moreover, the specific policy that we study likely reinforced externalities by
publicly disclosing the list of patents covered by the insurance policy thereby providing information on
the ‘quality’ of patents covered by the policy. This information might affect NPEs’ ability to effectively
assert these patents even against parties that have not purchased insurance coverage.
Finally, we note that prospects for the improvement of defensive litigation insurance appear to be
particularly good at this time. Thanks to the increasing availability of patent-related data, dozens of
patent analytics companies have been formed in the U.S. alone in recent years. Companies such as
Innography and Unified Patents have begun to use machine learning algorithms to score the “value” and
“quality” of individual patents, and litigation data providers such as Lex Machina and Docket Navigator
have made it easier than ever to predict the number, distribution, and outcome of U.S. patent suits. As
the actuarial assessment of patent risks becomes more and more tractable, it seems reasonable to assume
that patent litigation insurance will become more common and more cost effective, and thus will have
a more substantial effect on NPE business models. Indeed, the increasing availability of policies may
reflect this fact as much as any.
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Appendix
A Formal Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The firm rejects the settlement offer and the case goes to trial if p < q where q is defined
in equation (1). The unconditional probability the firm rejects is F (q). It is F (q) = 0 if the offer
is S ≤ pW + C̃ so that q ≤ p (and the firm always accepts). The probability is F (q) = q−p1−p if
pW + C̃ < S < W + C̃ so that the critical threshold is q ∈
(
p, 1
)
. Last, if the settlement offer is
S ≥W + C̃ so that q ≥ 1 (and the firm always rejects), the unconditional probability is F (q) = 1.
Conditional on the firm rejecting the offer (for p < q), the NPE’s probability of winning in court is
p̂(q) =
∫ q
p
xf(x)dx
F (x)
. (A-1)
Given the expressions for F (q) and the values for q, and under some abuse of notation, we can write this
conditional probability as:
p̂(q) =

∅ if S ≤ pW + C̃
S+pW−C̃
2W if pW + C̃ < S < W + C̃
1+p
2 if S ≥W + C̃.
(A-2)
Note that for sufficiently low values of S, the firm will always accept the settlement offer (q ≤ p) and
the case never goes to trial (F (q) = 0). In this case, the conditional probability is not defined, that is,
p̂(q) = 00 . We denote the NPE’s conditional probability in this case by p̂(q) = ∅. For intermediate values
of S, the firm sometimes rejects the settlement offer (q ∈
(
p, 1
)
and F (q) ∈ (0, 1)), and the conditional
probability is equal to
q+p
2 . For high values of S, the firm will always rejects the settlement offer (q ≥ 1
and F (q) = 1), and the conditional probability is equal to the unconditional probability,
1+p
2 .
Given the expressions for F (q) and p̂(q), we can write the NPE’s expected payoffs A(S, C̃) as:
A(S, C̃) =

S if S ≤ pW + C̃
(1+p)W
2 +
C̃2−(S−W )2
2(1−p)W
if pW + C̃ < S < W + C̃
(1+p)W
2 if S ≥W + C̃.
(A-3)
From this expression, we can quickly determine the optimal settlement offer, S∗. Suppose S is low (first
line), then the payoff-maximizing offer is pW + C̃. If, instead, the settlement offer is of intermediate
value (second line), then payoffs are maximized for S = W . The maximized payoffs for S = W are
strictly larger than the payoffs for S = pW + C̃. Further note that, if C̃ > 0 the NPE will never make
a high settlement offer S ≥ W + C̃ as for such an offer the payoffs are strictly smaller than for an offer
S = W . If, instead, C̃ = 0, any offer S ≥ W is strictly higher than for S ≥ W + C̃. If C̃ = 0, then the
payoffs for S = W and any offer S ≥ W ∗ are the same. This is because, for C̃ = 0, the optimal offer
S = W implies that the firm will never accept the offer but instead choose trial. Any offer exceeding
such an offer will induce the same actions.
We obtain the likelihood of settlement, L∗ = 1−F (q(S∗, C̃)), by combining the expressions for F ∗(q)
and S∗. The likelihood is equal to zero if C̃ = 0 (insurance status) and strictly positive otherwise, given
finite W . For W ≤ C̃1−p so that q ≤ p, the equilibrium settlement offer is always accepted so that the
likelihood of settlement, L∗(C̃) = 1, is not a function of W . For higher values of W , L is decreasing in
W .
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Follows immediately from the NPE’s payoffs in equation (4).
i
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The NPE is more likely to sue larger firms (conditional on insurance status) if its payoffs are
increasing in W , implying that higher type NPEs will eventually find it profitable to sue (larger firms).
We have
∂A∗
∂W
=
 p if W ≤
C̃
1−p
(1−p2)W 2−C̃2
2(1−p)W 2
if W > C̃1−p .
The first line of this expression is strictly positive by p > 0. The second line is positive if
W >
C̃
1− p2
.
This is always true given the condition for the second line (and C̃1−p >
C̃
1−p2 ).
Insurance is an effective deterrent if k is of intermediate value. As W increases, the range for
intermediate values of k is decreasing. For the respective range we obtain:
A∗(Cd)−A∗(0) =
 Cd −
(1−p)W
2 if W ≤
Cd
1−p
C2d
(1−p)W
if W > Cd1−p
These expressions are decreasing in W .
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The firm’s expected payoffs B∗(C̃) are
B∗(C̃) =

−
(
pW + C̃
)
if W ≤ C̃1−p
−
[
(1+p)W
2 + C̃
(
1− C̃
2(1−p)W
)]
if W > C̃1−p
(A-4)
The firm’s insurance purchase decision is by comparison of the payoffs in equations (6) and (7). By
equation (A-4), these payoffs depend on W . We consider the firm’s decision for low values of W and
high values of W .
- For low NPE types with k ≤ A∗(0) and low damages such that W ≤ Cd1−p , the firm buys insurance
if − (1+p)W2 −M ≥ −pW − Cd or
M ≤ Cd −
(
1− p
)
W
2
=: M̂. (A-5)
Note that, because W ≤ Cd1−p , M̂ > 0. For high damages such that W >
Cd
1−p , the firm buys
insurance if
−
(
1 + p
)
W
2
−M ≥ −
[(
1 + p
)
W
2
+ Cd
(
1− Cd
2
(
1− p
)
W
)]
or
M ≤ Cd
(
1− Cd
2
(
1− p
)
W
)
=: M̂. (A-6)
Again, because W > Cd1−p , the willingness to pay M̂ is strictly positive.
- For intermediate NPE types with A∗(0) < k ≤ A∗(Cd) and low damages such that W ≤ Cd1−p , the
ii
firm buys insurance if
M ≤ Cd + pW =: M̃. (A-7)
For high damages such that W > Cd1−p , the firm buys insurance if
M ≤ Cd
(
1− Cd
2
(
1− p
)
W
)
+
(
1 + p
)
W
2
=: M̃ (A-8)
- For high NPE types with k > A∗(Cd), the firm will not buy insurance as −M < 0.
Some rearranging reveals that M̃ = M̂ +
(1+p)W
2 for all W .
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Given our distributional assumptions and the assumption on the upper bound for k̄ (in Assump-
tion 1), we will consider four cases with respect to different values of W . (1) low values of W with
W ≤ Cd1−p and A
∗(Cd) < k̄; (2) values of W with W ∈
(
Cd
1−p ,W
′
)
such that A∗(Cd) < k̄; (3) values of W
with W ∈ [W ′,W ′′) such that k̄ ∈ (A∗(0), A∗(Cd)], W = W ′ such that k̄ = A∗(Cd) and W = W ′′ such
that k̄ = A∗(0)), where
W ′ =
k̄
(
1− p
)
+
√(
1− p
) [
k̄2
(
1− p
)
− C2d
(
1 + p
)]
1− p2
; (A-9)
and
W ′′ =
2k̄
1 + p
; (A-10)
and (4) values of W with W ≥ W ′′ such that k̄ ≤ A∗(0). Note that the term in square roots in the
expression for W ′ is strictly positive if
k̄ > Cd
√
1 + p
1− p
which always holds because, by Assumption 1, we have
k̄ >
Cd
1− p
>
Cd
1− p
√
1− p2 = Cd
√
1 + p
1− p
.
Moreover, by Assumption 1, the value for k̄ is such that each of these cases is non-trivial (i.e., Cd1−p <
W ′ < W ′′). In Panel (a) of Figure 2, the three critical thresholds for W are depicted by vertical lines.
In each of these four cases, the profit function Π(M) = Φ(M) [M − Cs(M)] is a step function, and
the insurer will set one of two insurance premia: low M̂ or high M̃ . The insurance company chooses the
high premium if Π̃ ≥ max{Π̂, 0} with Π̃ = Π(M̃) and Π̂ = Π(M̂). If both Π̃, Π̂ < 0 (only with strictly
positive demand), the insurance company will not offer an insurance policy.
Case 1: The insurer’s demand function is:
Φ(M) =

Cd+pW
k̄
if M ≤ M̂
Cd+pW
k̄
− (1+p)W
2k̄
if M̂ < M ≤ M̃
0 if M > M̃
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The marginal costs are:
Cs(M) =
{
W(1+p)
2k̄
Cd if M ≤ M̂
0 if M > M̂
The profits for the high premium are
Π̃ =
[
2Cd −
(
1− p
)
W
] (
Cd + pW
)
2k̄
; (A-11)
the profits with the low premium are
Π̂ = Π̃−
Cd
(
1 + p
)
W
(
Cd + pW
)
2k̄2
. (A-12)
From this last expression, it is easy to see that Π̃ ≥ Π̂ because Cd(1+p)W(Cd+pW)
2k̄2
> 0. Moreover, Π̃ > 0
if 2Cd −
(
1− p
)
W > 0 or W < 2Cd1−p . The latter holds true by Case 1.
Case 2: The insurer’s demand function is:
Φ(M) =

C2d
2Wk̄(1−p)
+
W(1+p)
2k̄
if M ≤ M̂
C2d
2Wk̄(1−p)
if M̂ < M ≤ M̃
0 if M > M̃
The marginal costs are:
Cs(M) =
{
W(1+p)
2k̄
Cd if M ≤ M̂
0 if M > M̂
The profits with the high premium are
Π̃ =
C2d
[
2Cd
(
1− p
)
W +
(
1− p2
)
W 2 − C2d
]
4k̄
(
1− p
)2
W 2
; (A-13)
profits with the low premium are
Π̂ = Π̃−
Cd
(
1 + p
) [
Cd
(
Cd + 2k̄
)
−W
(
2k̄
(
1− p
)
−
(
1− p2
)
W
)]
4k̄2
(
1− p
) . (A-14)
We find that Π̃ ≥ Π̂ if Cd
(
Cd + 2k̄
)
−W
[
2k̄
(
1− p
)
−
(
1− p2
)
W
]
≥ 0 or
C2d +W
2
(
1− p2
)
2
[
W
(
1− p
)
− Cd
] ≥ k̄.
Given Cd and p, the critical threshold is minimized for damages
Cd
1− p2
[
1 + p+
√
2
(
1 + p
)]
for which the critical threshold is
Cd
1− p
[
1 + p+
√
2
(
1 + p
)]
.
This is the upper bound for k̄ in Assumption 1, so that the condition is satisfied and Π̃ ≥ Π̂. Moreover,
Π̃ > 0 because
(
1− p2
)
W 2 − C2d > 0 by Case 2. To see this, rewrite the condition as W >
Cd√
1−p2
.
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Given, by Case 2, W > Cd1−p , the condition for Π̃ > 0 holds if
Cd
1−p >
Cd√
1−p2
which is indeed the case.
Case 3: The insurer’s demand function is:
Φ(M) =

1 if M ≤ M̂
1− (1+p)W
2k̄
if M̂ < M ≤ M̃
0 if M > M̃
The marginal costs are:
Cs(M) =
{
W(1+p)
2k̄
Cd if M ≤ M̂
0 if M > M̂
The profits for the high premium are
Π̃ =
[
2Cd − C
2
d
(1−p)W
+
(
1 + p
)
W
] [
1− (1+p)W
2k̄
]
2
; (A-15)
profits with the low premium are
Π̂ = Π̃−
(
1 + p
) [
C2d +W
(
2k̄
(
1− p
)
−
(
1− p2
)
W
)]
4k̄
(
1− p
) . (A-16)
We find that Π̃ ≥ Π̂ if
Cd
1− p
< W ≤
k̄ +
√
k̄2 +
C2d(1+p)
1−p
1 + p
.
Both inequalities hold by the case definition with W ∈ [W ′,W ′′). We have Cd1−p < W
′ and
W ′′ =
2k̄
1 + p
<
k̄ +
√
k̄2 +
C2d(1+p)
1−p
1 + p
because √
k̄2 +
C2d
(
1 + p
)
1− p
> k̄.
Moreover, Π̃ > 0 because 2Cd − C
2
d
(1−p)W
(rewritten to read W > Cd
2(1−p)
which holds by Case 3) and
1− (1+p)W
2k̄
(by Case 3 and W < W ′′).
Case 4: The insurer’s demand function is:
Φ(M) =

1 if M ≤ M̂
0 if M̂ < M ≤ M̃
0 if M > M̃
The marginal costs are:
Cs(M) =
{
Cd if M ≤ M̂
0 if M > M̂
v
The profits for the high premium are
Π̃ = 0; (A-17)
profits with the low premium are
Π̂ = Π̃− C
2
d
2W
(
1− p
) < 0. (A-18)
We find that Π̃ ≥ Π̂. For W ≥W ′′, the high premium implies zero insurance policy sales.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. As the high willingness to pay in equation (9) is increasing in W ,
∂M̃(W )
∂W
=
1
2
[
1 + p+
C2d(
1− p
)
W 2
]
> 0,
equilibrium insurance premium is increasing in W .
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From the results in the lemmatas.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From the results in the lemmatas.
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B Patent Characteristics
In this Appendix we provide an overview of the different measures of patent characteristics used in the
analysis:
• Age: computed as the difference between a patent’s priority year and 2016.
• Remaining patent term: computed as the difference between patent age in 2016 and statutory
patent term, where for applications filed on or after June 8, 1995 patent age is computed as the
difference between priority date and 2016 and statutory patent life is 20 years counting from the
priority date – for applications filed before June 8, 1995 patent age is computed as the shorter of (i)
the difference between 2016 and the filing date of the earliest application to which the patent claims
priority, or (ii) the difference between 2016 and the date on which the patent issued where statutory
patent term is 20 years for (i) counting from the priority date and 17 years for (ii) counting from
the date of issuance.
• Family size: the total number of patent family members.
• Forward citations: count of forward citations within first 3 years of earliest publication.
• Backward citations: count of backward citations.
• NPL citations: non-patent literature backward citation count.
• SEP: equal to one of a patent is declared essential to a technology standard according to Bekkers
et al. (2012).
• Fee award: equal to one if patent was subject to a fee award under section 285 of the U.S. Patent
Act (see also appendix C below).
• Business method/software: equal to one if a a patent is in USPC main classes 341, 345, 370,
380, 382, 700-707, 710, 711, 713-715, 717, 726, and 902 as defined by Chung et al. (2015).
• Independent claim length: the total number of independent claims as computed by Marco et al.
(2019).
• Independent claims count: the total number of independent claims as computed by Marco
et al. (2019).
• # assertions in court: total number of court cases in which a given patent was asserted prior
to the insurance policy becoming available.
• Challenged at PTAB: equal to one if a given patent was challenged at the PTAB prior to the
insurance policy becoming available.
C Attorney Fee Awards
In this Appendix, we detail how we collected the data used to construct the fee award dummy variable.
We identify all attorney fee awards made in U.S. patent suits 2010–2016. We obtained from Docket-
Navigator a list of all court orders issued 2010–2016 that (i) granted (in whole or in part) a motion
for attorney fees, and/or (ii) determined the amount of fees to award to a successful movant. To test
this list’s completeness, we cross-referenced with Jiam (2015), which provides a list of fee awards issued
between the Supreme Court’s April 29, 2014 opinion in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) and March 1, 2015. We then reviewed each order to determine the procedural
posture of the case at the time of the award and to determine the legal basis for the court’s award. Dur-
ing this review, we dropped all awards made as part of a default judgment (i.e., awards against parties
that did not defend the suit), as well as all awards not made pursuant to Section 285 of the U.S. Patent
Act (i.e., the provision at issue in the Octane Fitness case). For all remaining awards, we identified
the specific parties requesting and opposing the motion for fees and the specific patent(s) referenced in
the fee award. Finally, when fee awards were made in consolidated cases or multi-district litigation, we
expanded the data to the case-level by matching party-patent pairs to original, pre-consolidation case
filings.
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D Additional Figures
Figure A-1: Number of Court Cases Asserting Insured vs. Uninsured Patents
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Notes: Insured patents contain all asserted patents from Menu 1 and Menu 2; the comparison group in the
left-hand-side graph consists of all other asserted patents held by the same NPE groups that hold the insured
patents (Comparison Group 2); the comparison group in the right-hand-side graph consists of other NPEs that
do not hold any insured patents (Comparison Group 3).
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Figure A-2: Number of Court Cases Asserting Insured Patents
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Notes: The size of a bubble indicates the number of district court cases by month; insured patents contain all
asserted patents from Menu 1 and Menu 2.
Figure A-3: Number of Court Cases Asserting Uninsured Patents
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Notes: The size of a bubble indicates the number of court cases by month; uninsured patents are all asserted
patents held by NPE groups not covered by Menu 1 and Menu 2 of the IPISC insurance policy (Comparison
Group 3).
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Figure A-4: Permutation Test
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(b) Insurance randomized across all patents
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the difference in case filings between insured and uninsured patents by randomly
allocating insurance across all patents in the sample (10,000 times). For plot (a), insurance is randomly allocated within the
portfolio of a given NPE. The sample consists of NPE groups that hold at least twice as many uninsured as insured patents. For
plot (b) we use all NPE groups and pool all patents across NPEs (we exclude Intellectual Ventures from the sample). Plot (a)
shows that 97% of placebo estimates are larger than the actual estimate of -0.148. Plot (b) shows that 96% of placebo estimates
are larger than the actual estimate of -0.353.
Figure A-5: Defendants by Size (Court Cases)
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Figure A-6: Defendants by Business Group (Court Cases)
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Figure A-7: Patent Sales and Acquisitions of Insured Patents
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Notes: The figure only shows external re-assignments (re-assignments between entities that belong to the same
NPE are excluded).
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Figure A-8: Patent Sales and Acquisitions of Uninsured patents
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Notes: The figure only shows external re-assignments (re-assignments between entities that belong to the same
NPE are excluded).
Figure A-9: Patents Assertions by Portfolio
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Notes: The figure shows assertions associated with uninsured patents held by NPEs in Comparison group 2.
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E Additional Tables
Table A-1: NPE Groups and Patent Portfolios
NPE insured patents uninsured patents Share insured/uninsured
Name Type all asserted all asserted all asserted
Acacia PAE 19 17 2,116 401 0.009 0.044
Actus PAE 4 4 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Affinity PAE 2 2 25 13 0.080 0.153
Agincourt PAE 2 2 11 2 0.181 1.000
Altitude PAE 3 3 140 46 0.021 0.065
Antor PAE 1 1 1 0 1.000 0
Balthaser PAE 1 1 1 0 1.000 ONLY INSURED
Barstow PAE 4 4 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Cronos PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
CTP PAE 2 2 7 1 0.285 2.000
Curry PAE 1 1 10 7 0.100 0.142
Datatern PAE 2 2 1 0 2.000 ONLY INSURED
Datatreasury PAE 6 6 12 0 0.500 ONLY INSURED
Digitalriver PAE 1 1 103 6 0.009 0.166
Drone PAE 1 1 1 0 1.000 ONLY INSURED
Droplets PAE 2 2 4 1 0.500 2.000
Easyweb PAE 5 5 1 0 5.000 ONLY INSURED
Empire PAE 3 3 69 37 0.043 0.081
Eolas Univ. Heritage 2 2 14 0 0.142 ONLY INSURED
Essociate PAE 1 1 1 0 1.000 ONLY INSURED
Everglades PAE 1 1 1 0 1.000 ONLY INSURED
Farmer PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Fokas PAE 4 4 34 8 0.117 0.500
Fotomedia PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Freeman Indiv. 1 1 4 1 0.250 1.000
Geotag PAE 1 1 2 0 0.500 ONLY INSURED
Goldberg PAE 3 3 12 2 0.250 1.500
H-W PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Hawk PAE 1 1 5 3 0.200 0.333
Helferich PAE 6 6 21 21 0.285 0.285
Holub PAE 13 13 20 2 0.650 6.500
Horstemeyer PAE 35 31 55 34 0.636 0.911
Hothand PAE 1 1 6 0 0.166 ONLY INSURED
Innovatio PAE 18 17 15 9 1.200 1.888
Intelleq PAE 1 1 3 2 0.333 0.500
Interface PAE 2 2 5 2 0.400 1.000
Interval PAE 4 4 35 4 0.114 1.000
Ipnav PAE 10 10 369 64 0.027 0.156
Intellectual Ventures PAE 14 8 18,225 146 0.0007 0.054
Joao PAE 4 4 40 9 0.100 0.444
Klever PAE 1 1 11 6 0.090 0.166
Kroy PAE 1 1 2 1 0.500 1.000
Lockwood PAE 3 3 1 0 3.000 ONLY INSURED
Lodsys PAE 4 4 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Marathon PAE 8 8 130 36 0.061 0.222
Medina PAE 10 7 6 4 1.666 1.750
MFR PAE 24 1 40 2 0.600 0.500
Motivation PAE 1 1 2 0 0.500 ONLY INSURED
MPHJ PAE 5 5 6 0 0.833 ONLY INSURED
Multimedia PAE 4 4 13 11 0.307 0.363
Neomedia PAE 4 3 28 6 0.142 0.500
Network Signatures PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Norris PAE 3 3 28 11 0.107 0.272
Orientview PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Patentharbor PAE 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000
Pixfusion PAE 2 2 3 0 0.666 ONLY INSURED
Princeton PAE 1 1 7 7 0.142 0.142
Ranjan PAE 1 1 4 3 0.250 0.333
Recruitme PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Reese PAE 1 1 8 1 0.125 1.000
Reshare PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Securedmail PAE 5 5 3 2 1.667 2.500
Segan PAE 1 1 26 4 0.038 0.250
Silverscreen PAE 1 1 4 2 0.250 0.500
Skipprint PAE 3 3 6 6 0.500 0.500
Smartmetric PAE 1 1 0 0 ONLY INSURED ONLY INSURED
Sph PAE 1 0 15 15 0.066 0
Stambler Indiv. 3 3 4 0 0.750 ONLY INSURED
Steelhead PAE 1 1 2 2 0.500 0.500
Streetspace PAE 1 1 5 0 0.200 ONLY INSURED
Tong PAE 11 10 141 13 0.078 0.769
Ubicomm PAE 3 3 4 0 0.750 ONLY INSURED
Uniloc PAE 1 1 129 18 0.007 0.055
Vertigo PAE 3 2 39 3 0.076 0.666
Vringo PAE 2 2 67 6 0.029 0.333
Walker PAE 5 5 576 48 0.008 0.104
Webvention PAE 1 1 5 5 0.200 0.200
Zilka PAE 3 3 128 48 0.023 0.062
Notes: PAE: Patent Assertion Entity; Indiv.: Individual; Univ. Heritage: University Heritage.
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Table A-2: Comparison of Settlement Counts Between Insured and Uninsured Patents
Court cases settled
Before After Diff
# % # %
Insured
Insured 4,479 97.24 947 98.24 -0.99 *
Uninsured
Comparison Group 1a 1,081 93.19 871 92.36 0.82
Comparison Group 1b 887 92.69 701 91.75 0.93
Comparison Group 2a 3,834 95.16 1,480 93.85 1.31 **
Comparison Group 2b 1,108 94.70 569 93.13 1.57
Comparison Group 3a 6,495 92.47 4,942 94.37 -1.89 ***
Comparison Group 3b 1,060 92.58 454 83.15 9.42 ***
Notes: The sample consists only of cases that were terminated within 4 years after filing; insured patents
include patents from both Menu 1 and Menu 2; Comparison 1: comparison group consists of court cases in which
uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison 2: comparison group
consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted by the same NPE groups that the NPEs that hold
insured patents belong to; Comparison 3: comparison group consists of court cases brought by NPEs that do not
belong to “insured NPE groups;” for all comparison groups, we have matched the most similar patents that belong
to all other NPEs to the set of insured patents based on the patent characteristics described in the text (patent
age, family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, business method/software
patent, independent claim length, independent claims count, PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based
on IPC codes) using propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement; * significant at 10%, ** at 5%,
*** at 1%.
Table A-3: Sales of Insured Patents
Patent sale
(1) (2)
Insured patent 0.063** 0.002
(0.029) (0.026)
Post-launch -0.473*** -0.642***
(0.035) (0.105)
Insured × -0.440*** -0.112***
Post-launch (0.049) (0.029)
Patent characteristics YES YES
NPE FE NO YES
Month acquired FE NO YES
Observations 2,308 2,308
R2 0.372 0.586
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable: dummy variable equal to one if patent was sold in a given month. All regressions
include a constant. Time period is January 2010 – December 2016; patent characteristics described in the main text (patent age,
family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, independent claim length, independent claims
count, PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based on IPC codes); robust standard errors clustered at the NPE-level. *
significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A-4: Patent Sales and Acquisitions
Patent acquisitions Patent sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-launch -0.052 -0.077 0.052 0.064
(0.053) (0.056) (0.037) (0.040)
Intensity‡ × 0.094* -0.044
Post-launch (0.052) (0.041)
NPE FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116
R2 0.025 0.015 0.020 0.025
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable: dummy variable equal to one if NPE acquired a patent in a given month in columns
(1) and (2), dummy variable equal to one if NPE sold a patent in a given month in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include a
constant. Time period is January 2010 – December 2016; ‡ Intensity defined as number of insured patents divided by total number
of patents held by given NPE before insurance was launched; robust standard errors clustered at the NPE-level. * significant at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table A-5: Total Number of Court Cases at the Patent Level: Uninsured Patents
Comparison 1 Comparison 2
All Matched‡ All Matched‡
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-launch 0.003 -0.002 -0.034*** -0.037***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Matched patent× 0.008 0.011*
Post-launch (0.008) (0.006)
Patent FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 32,951 32,951 79,800 79,800
R2 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.011
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable: log number of cases by month. All regressions include a constant. Time period is
January 2010 – December 2016; Comparison 1: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents were asserted
by the same NPEs that hold insured patents; Comparison 2: comparison group consists of court cases in which uninsured patents
were asserted by the same NPE groups that the NPEs that hold insured patents belong to; ‡ “Matched” is set of uninsured patents
which were obtained from matching each insured patents to its most similar uninsured patent based on the patent characteristics
described in the text (patent age, family size, forward citations, backward citations, NPL citations, SEP, fee award, business
method/software patent, independent claim length, independent claims count, PTAB challenge, and 35 technology classes based
on IPC codes) using propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement. Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, **
at 5%, *** at 1%.
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